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Airport Privatization in India: 




1.  Introduction 
 
In  June  2003,  the  Airports  Authority  of  India  (AAI)  board  approved  a  modernization 
proposal through the privatization route for Delhi and Mumbai airports. The bidding process 
began in May 2004 with an original completion date of September 2004. However, due to a 
variety  of  reasons,  the  bids  were  finally  sought  and  received  by  September  2005.  The 
evaluation process of the bids was questioned at various levels. There were many reviews of 
this with inputs from experts.  
 
The major policy decisions were made by the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM). 
There were other supporting committees involved in the bidding process. Exhibit 1 gives 
the scope and members of these committees. The final decision was made in January 2006 
by the EGoM after compromising on some of its own set parameters for Mumbai airport. 
One of the losing bidders called this an arbitrary decision making process and challenged 
the decision in court. After two stages of legal battle, the bidder finally lost the case in 
November 2006 and the original awardees retained their position. Work is now progressing 
at these airports. 
 
This paper focuses on the bidding process and  brings out the lessons learnt. The paper 
draws  significantly  from  a  series  of  cases  written  on  the  subject  by  the  authors  [Jain, 
Raghuram and Gangwar, 2007]. 
 
2.  Early Steps Towards Privatization
2 
The modernization of Delhi and Mumbai airports had been considered as early as 1996 by 
the AAI. In 1998, the Prime Minister had made a declaration that world class airports would 
be set up in the country. A task force on infrastructure recommended in 1999 that a long 
term lease for outsourced management should be considered. They were not in favour of 
corporatization. In June 2003, the AAI board approved a modernization proposal costing 
approximately Rs 30 billion for Delhi and Mumbai airports. An AAI Amendment Bill was 
passed by the parliament authorizing AAI to transfer the operations and management of its 
existing airports by way of long term lease to private players. These were expected to run 
for a period of at least 30 years, with an option to extend for a further 30 years. However, 
                                                 
1 Prepared by Rekha Jain, G Raghuram, and Rachna Gangwar.  
 
We thank Meghna Mathur for the research assistance provided.  
 
This paper is an outcome of the series of cases ‘Airport Privatization: Bidding Process for Delhi and Mumbai 
A-E’ written on the subject by the authors. Sections 2,3,4 and 5 are identical content from Case A. Section 6 
excerpts identical content from Cases B,C and D. The purpose of this working paper is to give flexibility for 
use as a single document along with lessons learnt rather than sequentially discuss the cases. 
 
2 Some of the content in this section is sourced from 
http://pd.cpim.org/2006/0108/01082005_nilotpal%20box.htm?&lang=en_us&output=json accessed on 
November 02, 2006  
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air  traffic  control  would  remain  the  responsibility  of  AAI  and  security  that  of  the 
government. The Act was notified as effective from July 01, 2003. 
In September 2003, a cabinet meeting of the then National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government approved a restructuring of the Delhi and Mumbai airports on a long term lease 
by adopting joint venture route with 74 per cent equity of a private consortium and 26 per 
cent of AAI. They also constituted the EGoM for implementing the decision. The Ministry 
of Civil Aviation (MoCA) constituted the IMG in October 2003 to assist the EGoM. The 
then EGoM met on November 09, 2003 under the chair of the Finance Minister.   
 
The EGoM approved the appointment of ABN Amro as the financial consultants (FC) on 
December  22,  2003.  An  Invitation  to  Register  an  Expressions  of  Interest  (ITREOI)  for 
acquisition of 74 per cent equity stake in the Joint Venture Company (JVC) was issued on 
February 17, 2004. Last date of submission of expression of interest (EOI) as a response to 
the  ITREOI  was  June  04,  2004.  Exhibit  2  gives  excerpts  from  the  ITREOI,  including 
government  objectives  and  decisions,  and  bid  structure.  AAI’s  overall  objective  was  to 
complete the transaction for both the airports not later than September, 2004. Exhibit 3 
gives a macro economic perspective on the rationale for restructuring and modernization of 
Delhi and Mumbai airports as given in the ITREOI. It also describes the functions which 
were distributed among MoCA, AAI, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), 
and the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS).  
 
As of March 31, 2003, there were 449 airports/airstrips in the country. Commercial air 
services  were  possible  only  to  122  AAI  approved  airports.  Eleven  of  these  were 
international, 83 were domestic civil airports and 28 were civil enclaves at defence airfields. 
Of  these,  commercial  airlines  operated  only  through  60  airports.  The  remaining  were 
unutilized, at best handling occasional charter aircraft operations. Only 11 out of the 122 
airports generated profits. 
 
3.  Delhi and Mumbai Airports
3 
 
The Delhi and Mumbai airports accounted for 47% of the passenger traffic in 2003-04. 
They were even more significant in terms of cargo traffic, accounting for 58% of the share. 
Catering to this, the aircraft movements share was 38%. These airports generated one third 
of all revenues earned by the AAI. Both Delhi and Mumbai airports handled twice as many 
aircraft movements as they were originally designed for, resulting in congestion for both 
aircrafts and passengers.  
 
In 2003-04, Delhi airport handled 10.4 million passengers, of which 58% were domestic. 
The total cargo traffic was 296 thousand tons, of which 31% was domestic. The main source 
of  revenue  at  Delhi  airport  was  aeronautical  services  (42%).  Non-aeronautical  services 
included cargo (26%), and commercial and others (32%).  
 
In 2003-04, Mumbai airport handled 13.3 million passengers, of which 60% were domestic. 
The total cargo traffic was 326 thousand tons, of which 28% was domestic. The main source 
                                                 
3 The content in this section is mainly sourced from  
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2303/stories/20060224006913000.htm and 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31659 (both accessed on October 24, 2006)  
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of  revenue  at  Delhi  airport  was  aeronautical  services  (50%).  Non-aeronautical  services 
included cargo (17%), and commercial and other (33%).  
 
During  the  early  period  of  the  tenth  plan  (2002-07),  passenger  traffic  had  grown  at  an 
average yearly rate of 7%. The government was expecting an average yearly growth of 16%  
by 2010, given the “open skies” policies and the response by the private sector to new 
airlines, including low cost carriers.  
 
Nearly 97% of the country's foreign tourists arrived by air, mostly through the Delhi and 
Mumbai gateways. Tourism was the nation's second largest foreign exchange earner. While 
cargo carried by air weighed less than 1% of the total cargo exported/imported, it accounted 
for nearly 20% of the total value. 
 
A survey by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) revealed that for the year 
1999, Delhi and Mumbai airports ranked amongst the three least favored airports in the Asia 
Pacific region in each of the 19 service elements considered. The overall ratings for Delhi 
and Mumbai were 2.6 and 2.3 respectively on a 5 point scale, while the average for airports 
in the Asia Pacific region was 3.5 and for world airports was 3.8. Out of the 57 airports 
covered in the survey, Denmark’s Copenhagen, Singapore's Changi and Finland's Helsinki 
ranked among the top for overall passenger satisfaction, with ratings of 4.3 to 4.4.  
 





The country went for general elections in May 2004, resulting in the change of government 
to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The UPA government was supported by the Left 
parties.  The  new  government  took  over  towards  the  end  of  May,  2004  and  adopted  a 
National Common Minimum Program, in which a thrust on infrastructure development was 
a key focus area. 
 
The EGoM was reconstituted under the chair of the Defence Minister on June 15, 2004. The 
EGoM decided not to review the earlier cabinet decision, though it put a cap of 49 per cent 
on foreign direct investment within the 74 per cent of the private equity in the JVC. Equity 
participation of Indian scheduled airlines was revised upwards from 5 per cent to 10 per 
cent. The last date of submission of EOI was extended to July 20, 2004. 
 
The EGoM considered and approved the appointment of Air Plan, Australia as the global 
technical advisor (GTA) and Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co (AMSS) as 
legal consultants (LC) on June 25, 2004.  
 
Ten bidders submitted EOIs by July 20, 2004. Exhibit 4 gives the background information 
on the bidders. Nine bidders excluding Videocon were shortlisted as pre qualified bidders 
(PQB). The Videocon consortium was rejected because the group had involved an airport 
consultant rather than an airport operator.  
 
                                                 
4 Some of the content in this section is sourced from 
http://pd.cpim.org/2006/0108/01082005_nilotpal%20box.htm?&lang=en_us&output=json (accessed on  
December 10, 2006)  
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The AAI appointed Thakur, Vaidyanath Aiyar & Co (TVA) as accounting and tax advisor 
for  the  bidding  process  in  August,  2004.  The  IMG  was  reconstituted  in  October,  2004 
replacing the Additional Secretary and Financial Advisor of MoCA by Secretary, MoCA as 
the chair of the Group (with a mandate for submitting its report within 15 days).  
 
Request for Proposal 
 
The EGoM approved key principles of the RFP document along with the draft transaction 
documents. The RFP document for Delhi and Mumbai airports and the draft transaction 
documents were issued to nine PQBs on April 1, 2005. Exhibit 5 gives the excerpts from the 
RFP that describe the evaluation process.  
 
The finals bids were to be submitted no later than 5 pm on the June 24, 2005. The pre bid 
process  envisaged  management  presentations,  site  visits,  due  diligence  –  question  and 
answer process, technical inspection of airports, management interviews, proposed changes 
in  the  draft  transaction  documents,  review  meetings  of  PQBs  with  the  government 
transaction team and culmination with the lodgment of  offers. Dates and deadlines were 
provided for each of the above.  
 
The  evaluation  process  was  to  be  conducted  in  four  phases.  Phase  I  required  the 
consideration of certain mandatory requirements. Phase  II involved the consideration of 
financial  commitment.  All  remaining  offers  would  be  then  assessed  in  Phase  III  for  a 
minimum benchmark of 80% on the two technical pre-qualification criteria. These two were 
(a) Management Capability, Commitment and Value Add and (b) Development Capability, 
Commitment and Value Add. For each of the above criteria, there were various sub-criteria. 
Marks were assigned to the sub-criteria so that the total for a criterion added to 100. The 
assessment was to be on an absolute (and not on a relative) basis between the offers. There 
was no pre-determined number of offers that would be considered for Phase IV.  
 
Phase IV involved the assessment of the financial consideration, which was on the basis of a 
percentage of gross revenue (both aeronautical and non-aeronautical) that would be shared 
with  the  government.  The  principle  was  that  the  bidder  with  the  highest  revenue  share 
would be the successful bidder.  
 
As it was possible that a bidder could bid for more than one airport, it was also envisaged 
that the highest bidder may be the highest for both the airports. In such a case, the highest 
bidder would be declared as the successful bidder for that airport where the margin between 
the highest offer and the second best offer was the most. Accordingly, the successful bidder 
for the other airport would be the bidder with the second best offer for that airport provided 
that the bidder was willing to match the highest bidder for that airport.  
 
It was also envisaged that there may be a situation where the above margin may be the 
same. Then it was provided that the highest bidder would be declared as the successful 
bidder for that airport where the offer was the highest and the successful bidder for the other 
airport would be the bidder with the second best offer for that airport provided that the 
bidder was willing to match the highest bidder for that airport. 
 
For the first five year the JVCs were mandated to undertake capital expenditure of Rs 28 
billion at Delhi and Rs 26 billion at Mumbai. The expenditure on development of Delhi  
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airport was likely to be Rs 79 billion for the period 2005–2024 whereas for Mumbai airport, 





The  transaction  documents  had  been  finalized  after  several  rounds  of  inter-ministerial 
consultations and with the involvement of ABN Amro, Air Plan, AMSS and TVA. Inputs 
from the PQBs were also invited on the documents and through a pre-bid conference. The 
following diagram gives the overview of the transaction structure. 
 
 
[Source: ABN Amro (as given in “Information Memorandum: Indira Gandhi International 
Airport.” Airport Authority of India, April 01, 2005)] 
 
The transaction documents consisted of  
Operation Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) 
Lease Deed (LD) 
Shareholders Agreement (SHA) 
State Support Agreement (SSA) 
State Government Support Agreement (SGSA) 
Substitution Agreement (SA) 
 
The OMDA was the mother document under which the AAI, in the interest of the better 
management of the airport and the overall public interest, granted the right to undertake the 
functions  of  operating,  maintaining,  developing,  designing,  constructing,  upgrading, 
modernizing, financing and managing the airport to the JVC. The OMDA was for an initial 
term  of  30  years,  and  subject  to  certain  conditions  being  fulfilled,  extendable  by  an 
                                                 
5 Some of the content is sourced from Economic Times, 2
nd February 2006. ‘Airport user charges, tariffs to 
stay’ and http://www.civilaviation.nic.in/greenfield/SSA_Delhi.pdf (accessed on October 12, 2006)  
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additional period of 30 years. Airport development under the OMDA was governed by the 
master plan, evolved by the JVC with inputs from MoCA. The OMDA also contained the 
list of mandatory capital projects that the JVC had to undertake by March 31, 2010. 
 
The OMDA contained a list of aeronautical and permitted non-aeronautical activities that 
the JVC should undertake, and a list of ‘reserved activities’ (being governmental sovereign 
functions  like  customs,  immigration  etc)  that  the  JVC  may  not  undertake.  Stand  alone 
commercial  activities  also  were  not  permitted.  Non-aeronautical  activities  were  to  be 
restricted to 5% of the total land in Delhi and 10% of total land in Mumbai provided that the 
activities were primarily meant for passengers or air transport industry. Exhibit 6 gives the 
various activities that would be considered as aeronautical and non-aeronautical. 
 
The  documents  provided  for  a  three  month  (extendable  to  six)  transition  period  during 
which airport management would be transferred from AAI to JVC at which time the AAI 
would ‘hand-hold’ the JVC. The current employees of the AAI posted at the airport would 
be retained there on for a minimum period of three years as AAI employees during which 
period or at the expiry of which, the JVC would be required to make offers of employment 
to the employees on terms which were no less beneficial than the current arrangement. The 
employees would have the option to accept the JVC offer.   
 
The OMDA prescribed objective and subjective service quality standards that the JVC was 
required to achieve and maintain at the airports, the time frame within which this should be 
achieved and the liquidated damages for non-achievement. The various default conditions 
and consequences were specified, which could lead up to termination, substitution by a 
‘substitute’ entity as specified in the SA and step in rights for AAI in the case of Force 
Majeure and emergencies. In addition, a performance bond in the form of Rs 5 billion bank 
guarantee was to be provided and would be  encashable in part or whole under various 
conditions of non-performance.  
 
The Government of India (GoI) had agreed to use reasonable efforts to set up the Airport 
Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) and make it operational within two years from the 
effective date. Till such time as the AERA commenced regulating aeronautical charges, the 
same would be approved by the GoI in accordance with the broad principles set out in the 
agreement. 
 
The JVC was required to charge for aeronautical services at rates as specified by the GoI for 
the first three years and thereafter determined by AERA/GoI as the case may be under the 
SSA.  Non-aeronautical  services  would  be  provided  at  rates  fixed  by  the  JVC  in  a 
competitive manner. Essential services would be provided free of charge.   
 
According to the LD, the land would be leased for a period of 30 years from the effective 
date and would, in the event the JVC renewed the term of the OMDA, be renewed for an 
additional period of 30 years. The lease was co-terminus with the OMDA. According to the 
SHA,  26  per  cent  of  the  share  would  be  held  by  AAI,  GoI,  and  PSUs,  and  private 
participants  would  hold  74%.  Foreign  shareholding  was  restricted  to  49%.  Scheduled 
airlines equity cap was restricted at 10% of aggregate shareholding of all scheduled airlines, 
while foreign airlines could not have any share holding. The JVC was to have an authorized 
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Upon the expiry and termination of the OMDA, the AAI would take over all the access 
required for operating the airport and would have the option to take over all or any of the 
commercial ancillary assets.  
 
In case a second airport was to be considered within a 150 km radius of the airports given to 
the JVC; by following a competitive bidding process, the JVC could also participate if it 
wished to exercise its Right of First Refusal (RoFR). In the event the JVC was not the 
successful bidder, but its bid was within the range of ± 10% of the most competitive bid 
received, the JVC would have the RoFR by matching the first ranked bid in terms of the 
selection criteria for the second airport, provided it had satisfactory performance without 
any material default under any project agreement at the time of exercising the RoFR.   
 
The JVC was to first submit a master plan before the expiry of six months from the date of 
execution of the OMDA and thereafter update and resubmit the same periodically, every 10 
years. The master plan was subject to a ‘review’ process rather than an ‘approval’ process. 
 
The JVC would have to acknowledge that it would be its sole responsibility and obligation 
to obtain all clearances which were required by the applicable laws. The GoI intended to 
give  the  undertaking  that  it  would  establish  a  single  window  clearance  mechanism  for 
providing assistance on a best endeavor basis to the JVC. There would be joint coordination 
committees to ensure smooth and efficient rendering of GoI services. The overall liabilities 
of GoI in respect of claims had been kept at Rs 500 million. The principles of tariff fixation 
had been enclosed in a schedule to the OMDA. 
 
The SGSA would be between the respective state governments (Maharashtra/Delhi) and the 
JVC. The state governments intended to give undertaking that they would make best efforts 
in  providing  support  to  the  company  and  AAI  on  matters  relating  to  encroachments, 
additional land for airport development, surface access to airports, provision of utilities, 




Review meetings were held with the PQBs on various aspects of the transaction documents, 
partly at their request. The transaction documents were finalized only by August 30, 2005. 
These were issued to eight PQBs, with the extended bid date of September 14, 2005. In the 
interim, the DLF-MANSB consortium had dissolved itself. MANSB was invited to join the 
GMR-Fraport consortium. Out of eight PQBs, Bharti-Changi and L&T-Piramal-Hochtief 
pulled out citing stiff performance conditions in the transaction documents (see box below). 
Five consortia submitted their bids for the Delhi airport and six for the Mumbai airport. 
GVK-ACSA did not submit a bid for the Delhi airport. Essel-TAV submitted their bid after 
5pm on September 14, 2005. In spite of objections, it was accepted by noting the time of 
submission. 
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5.  Post Bid Events (September 2005 – January 2006)
6 
 
Exhibit 7 gives a summarized flow chart of the post bid events. 
 
September 16, 2005: AAI employees called for a nationwide strike on September 29, 2005, 
protesting against the privatization. The strike was only a partial success since many of the 
employees were in support with the ‘favourable’ terms offered to them. 
  
September 19, 2005: The IMG constituted the EC consisting of the FC, LC and GTA. The 
IMG also suggested that a GRC be constituted for an independent review of the evaluation 
undertaken by the EC. 
 
September 22, 2005: The technical bids were opened for evaluation by the EC. 
 
October 10, 2005: The MoCA constituted a GRC to evaluate the EC report. The GRC was 
under the chair of Mr Raghu Menon, the Additional Secretary of MoCA with seven other 
members. 
 
November 21-24, 2005: The EC placed its reports before the IMG, announcing the two 





Bidder  Management 
capability, commitment 
and value add 
Development capability, 
commitment and value add 
Delhi Airport 
Reliance-ASA  80.2  81.0 
GMR-Fraport  84.9  80.1 
DS Construction-Munich  72.7  69.9 
Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  61.9 
Essel-TAV  39.2  40.3 
Mumbai Airport 
Reliance-ASA  80.4  80.2 
GMR-Fraport  84.9  92.7 
DS Construction-Munich  72.7  54.1 
Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  55.1 
Essel-TAV  37.1  28.3 
GVK-ACSA  75.8  59.3 
[Source: ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports 
Authority of India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913, http://www.indlaw.com accessed 
on January 15, 2007] 
 
The finding of the EC vis-à-vis the GMR-Fraport consortium was that bid was good but 
there were certain areas of weakness in relation to the experience on Indian retail, handling 
of  HR  issues  in  ownership  change  situation,  providing  of  multiple  nominations  for 
management and support positions. These deficiencies were common to both Delhi and 
                                                 
6 This section has mainly been sourced from variety of news items, Supreme Court Judgment and internal 
communication of GMR. Significant sources have been identified.  
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Mumbai airports. In addition, the evaluation report of the Delhi airport also noted that the 
initial development plan was unsuitable for implementation in its current form.  
 
The finding of the EC vis-à-vis the Reliance-ASA consortium noted that the bid was very 
strong with a committed Indian partner and an experienced airport operator. ASA, Mexico 
had approximately 60 airports under its control in Mexico itself. They had experience in the 
area of airport development, master planning, retail, and freight. With specific reference to 
Mumbai, the experience of ASA in dealing with encroachments was also highlighted. 
 
The EC report was placed before the IMG where the member representing the Planning 
Commission (PC), Mr Gajendra Haldea, raised several objections on the short listing of the 
two PQBs. He objected to the complete process and took a view that there was a possibility 
of bias in the eligibility criteria and in the evaluation of the same. He also had raised the 
issue that Frankfurt airport ranked 42 and Mexico airport ranked 119 among the top 135 
airports in 2005 survey. Mumbai airport had ranked 120. Issues pertaining to the conflict of 
interest of the  consultants ABN Amro and  AMSS were  raised. ABN  Amro had named 
Reliance and GMR amongst their top five borrowers.  
 
On reviewing the EC report, the GRC was of the view that the evaluation was broadly 
consistent. However, there could be marginal variations in certain individual criteria due to 
inherent subjectivity in the evaluation process. The GRC also listed several areas where the 
EC had gone beyond the scope of the RFP. 
 
December 02, 2005: There was a further meeting of the IMG to consider the EC and GRC 
reports.  The  IMG  did  not  come  to  any  consensus.  However,  they  made  a  few 
recommendations to the EGoM including that the GMR consortium should clearly indicate 
the specific personnel who would take the key management and development roles for the 
airport. Recommendations also included that each of the bidders should be bound to invest 
the funds to carry out the plans and strategies as highlighted in their bid documents.  
 
On the conflict of interest, an opinion of the Attorney General (AG) had been sought. He 
opined that there was no conflict. 
 
December 03, 2005: A cabinet note dated December 3, 2005, prepared for the EGoM had 
more to say on the bidding process. A write up by Thakurta and Majumdar
7 stated the 
following on the matter  
 
“A confidential cabinet note dated December 3, 2005 prepared for the Empowered 
Group of Ministers noted that the Government Review Committee, after conducting 
an independent review, was of the view that, while no apparent bias or prejudice was 
evident for or against any individual bidders, “a majority of the evaluation criteria, 
as  stipulated  in  the  RFP  (request  for  proposals)  documents,  are  necessarily 
subjective in nature and therefore it would have been difficult to allocate a purely 
objective marking across all bidders.” 
The note also observed that the Inter Ministerial Group had expressed their concern 
about the way marks were allotted and weightage given to different parameters. The 
                                                 
7 Sourced from http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/29spec1.htm?&lang=en_us&output=json  accessed on 
December 08, 2006.  
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system  of  awarding  marks  by  'consensus  opinion'  rather  than  by  working  out 
averages of marks given by individual evaluators was also questioned.  
“There was also concern about the fact that one of the bidders [D S Construction] 
who  had  selected  Munich  airport  as  a  partner,  was  rejected,  while  another 
(Reliance) who selected  Mexico had actually qualified, The cabinet note stated, 
adding ‘This was in spite of the fact that Munich airport is ranked much higher than 
Mexico. 
According to the note, the çonsultants had adopted an approach that was different 
from the one indicated in the RFP documents. While the consultants agreed that 
there was indeed such a discrepancy, they claimed that such an action had been done 
after due consideration and applied equitably to all bidders.  
The note also observed that the IMG members were of the view that the consultants 
should  own  responsibility  for  the  evaluation.  ‘After  discussion,  the  consultants 
agreed that the disclaimer would be changed to indicate they owned responsibility 
for  the  evaluation.  They  however  wanted  to  be  indemnified  against  any 
financial/legal suits.’ 
The  evaluation  report  submitted  by  the  consultants  had,  through  a  disclaimer, 
completely  absolved  themselves  of  any  responsibility  of  their  evaluation  in  any 
manner. 
The relevant paragraph (5) of the disclaimer reads as follows: While due care has 
been  taken  in  the  preparation  of  this  report,  neither  [the  consultants]  ABN 
Amro/Airplan  nor  their  employees  or  advisors  make  any  representations  or 
warranty, express or implied, or accept any responsibility or liability, whatsoever, 
in respect of any statements or omissions herein, or the accuracy, completeness or 
reliability of this report, and shall incur no liability under any law, statute, rules or 
regulations as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of this report, even if any 
loss or damages is caused by any act or omission on the part of ABN Amro/Airplan 
or their employees or advisors, whether negligent or otherwise.’  
It was also agreed that the bidders should be legally bound to carry out the plans and 
strategies and invest funds as enunciated in their bid documents. ‘It was felt that 
appropriate  undertakings  for  this  should  be  obtained  before  the  final 
selection,’according to the cabinet note.  
It went on to add that the Inter Ministerial Group had reached a consensus on asking 
the  GMR-Frapport  consortium  to  confirm  the  names  of  the  people  who  will 
undertake  key  management  and  development  roles  in  view  of  the  multiple 
nominations in each position for both airports.  
A representative of the Planning Commission (Gajendra Haldea), adviser to deputy 
chairman of the Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia was of the view 
that  some  government  agency  or  the  Inter  Ministerial  Group  should  also  take 
responsibility for the evaluation of the bids, the nore abserved.   
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Haldea  also insisted that a fresh technical evaluation be undertaken by the  Inter 
Ministerial Group and only those bidders who are non-responsive in terms of the 
mandatory conditions should be disqualified’ and that this should be done before the 
financial bids áre opened.”  
  
December 05, 2005: The EGoM asked the IMG for a ‘firm’ recommendation on bidders 
without any dilution in the technical qualification norms and wanted final recommendations 
within two weeks. Accordingly, the EC was asked by IMG to strictly adhere to the RFP 
documents and award marks again 
 
December 07, 2005: The MoCA said that all six bidders were in the final round of bidding. 
No one was disqualified on technical grounds at this juncture. The MoCA decided to have 
the  technical bids re-evaluated based on complaints of a ‘biased’ approach adopted by the 
technical advisor, Air Plan. 
 
December  14,  2005:  The  revised  evaluation  by  the  EC  reflected  marginal  changes  (see 





Bidder  Management capability, 
commitment and value add 
Development capability, 
commitment and value add 
  Old  New  Old  New 
Delhi Airport 
Reliance-ASA  80.2  80.9  81.0  81.0 
GMR-Fraport  84.9  84.7  80.1  80.1 
DS Construction-Munich  72.7  73.1  69.9  70.5 
Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  57.0  61.9  61.9 
Essel-TAV  39.2  37.6  40.3  41.4 
Mumbai Airport 
Reliance-ASA  80.4  81.0  80.2  80.2 
GMR-Fraport  84.9  84.7  92.7  92.7 
DS Construction-Munich  72.7  73.1  54.1  54.7 
Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  57.0  55.1  65.1 
Essel-TAV  37.1  35.5  28.3  29.4 
GVK-ACSA  75.8  76.0  59.3  59.3 
[Source: ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports 
Authority of India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913, http://www.indlaw.com (accessed 
on January 15, 2007)] 
 
The IMG discussed the issue of subjectivity in the EC’s marks. The issue that marks given 
to Reliance-ASA consortium appeared to be high was raised by Member Finance, AAI, and 
Chairman, AAI. The IMG again failed to reach a unanimous conclusion.  
 
December 15, 2005
8: “Parliamentarians belonging to the Left parties and the regional 
Samajwadi Party walked out of the Lok Sabha  after their demand that the entire bidding 
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process be scrapped immediately was not accepted by the government. They had alleged 
that the consultants had close business links with the bidders.  
 
While  Praful  Patel  claimed  that  the  bidding  process  was  fair,  two  leftist  legislators  --
Nilotpal  Basu  of  the  Communist  Party  of  India-Marxist  and  Abani  Roy  of  the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party, wrote to the UPA chair, Sonia Gandhi, complaining of ‘large-
scale irregularities’ in the bidding process. The communists demanded that the government 
allow AAI to select its own joint venture partners from any country in the world for the 
modernization of the airports.”   
 
December 20, 2005: The subsidiary of Reliance, which was driving their consortium, wrote 
to Pranab Mukherjee on December 20, 2005. The write up by Thakurta and Majumdar
9 
stated the following based on the letter  
“The subsidiary claims to the effect that the bidding process was manipulated were 
'unfounded.'  
The letter… states that a survey by Skytrax used to rank airports all over the world 
does not take into account the operational capabilities of the surveyed airports. Other 
surveys conducted by  organisations like AETRA and J D Power,  which seek to 
measure different sets of parameters, ‘áll of them  qualitative in nature and based on 
passenger opinions which are largely subjective.’ 
Reacting to the charge that there was 'conflict of interest' between the consultants 
appointed by the ministry of civil aviation, Amarchand Mangaldas and Suresh A 
Shroff & Co (legal consultant) and ABN Amro (financial consultant) the Reliance 
group  company  claimed  that  both  ABN  Amro  and  Amarchand  Mangaldas  have 
worked with almost all top companies in India and that If the logic put forward is 
taken to its logical conclusion, it would be difficult to find any consultant for the 
bid.’  
It was further contended… that Amarchand Mangaldas acted as ‘the legal advisors 
to Reliance Industries Limited for the de-merger scheme and not the bidder, which 
belongs  to  the  ADAE  group  (or  the  Anil  Dhirubhai  Ambani  Enterprise  Group) 
headed by Anil Ambani.’
10  
Regarding the flaws that have been pointed out in various stages of the bidding 
process, the letter from Reliance airport developers said that a ‘three-stage bid is an 
accepted  and  common  process  followed  by  the  GoI  as  well  as  governments 
worldwide for infrastructure projects’.  
                                                 
9 Sourced from http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/dec/29spec1.htm?&lang=en_us&output=json (Accessed 
on December 12, 2006) 
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The  letter  added  the  government,  ‘in  its  competitive  bidding  guidelines  for 
procurement of power, recommends a multi-stage bid involving a separate RFQ,, 
technical, and financial bid stages with elimination at each stage.’  
….(it) sought to dispute the view that the bidding process was not competitive, by 
stating, “at the time of submission of bids, there was enough competitive pressure 
and that is what matters.”  
Reliance Airport Developers was also of the view that because the evaluation criteria for 
technical  bids  were  known  after  April  2005  when  the  RFP  (request  for  proposals)  was 
issued,  “it  is  inexplicable  why  were  such  objections  [that  the  technical  evaluation  was 
subjective and that bidders could change their plans] not raised earlier…The allegation of 
bias in eligibility criteria is clearly an afterthought and should have been raised before the 
bid submission.”   
December 21, 2005: The EGoM, noting the failure of IMG to reach a conclusion,  decided 
to  set  up  the  CoS  headed  by  the  Cabinet  Secretary  to  help  it  prepare  the  final 
recommendations on the bidding process for modernizing Delhi and Mumbai airports. The 
PC was a special invitee to this EGoM meeting.  
 
December 24, 2005: The CoS constituted the GETE headed by Mr E Sreedharan to examine 
the evaluation process since it did not have the requisite technical expertise and desired the 
process to be undertaken by an independent committee. The Prime Minister’s Office was 
said to have discouraged rebidding for the project since it had already been delayed. 
The scope of GETE was11:  
·  An overall validation of the evaluation process, including calibration of the qualifying 
cut-off and sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis would cover the impact of inter- 
se weightages of sub-criteria as well as scoring. 
·  Addressing the issues raised by the members of IMG about the evaluation process. 
·  An overall technical assessment of transparency and fairness of the evaluation process, 
including steps required, if any, to achieve a transparent and fair outcome. 
·  Providing suggestions for improving the selection procedure for joint venture partners in 
future. 
January  9,  2006:  The  CoS  considered  the  GETE  report  submitted  on  January  7,  2006. 
Exhibit 8 gives excerpts from this report. The key GETE conclusions were: 
·  There has been certain technical flaws in the technical evaluation process. 
·  Assignment of marks to sub-factors was not done before the technical evaluation was 
commenced.  
·  Marks have been reassessed on four principles: 
o  Weightages  were  assigned  to  sub-factors  equally.  (The  EC  had  assigned  the 
weightages on a ‘subjective’ basis). 
                                                 
11 Sourced from ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports Authority of 
India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913  
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o  Since the non-OECD experience of ASA was only in airport development and 
not in operations, giving high marks to this was not in conformity with the RFP. 
(The EC had given 75% marks). 
o  The marks for the current non-aeronautical revenue share of the bidders were 
rescaled to begin at 50% (from 75%) for the ‘required’ 40% share. 
o  The marks for the proposed three year staff absorption share were rescaled to 
begin at 0% (from 50%) for the minimum 40% share. 
·  A liberal attitude was shown by the EC to the Reliance-ASA consortium to get marks 
just above 80% and thus get qualified. 
·  On  reassessment,  marks  of  Reliance-ASA  are  74.6  for  Delhi  and  75.0  for  Mumbai. 
Hence, Reliance-ASA is not qualified. 
·  If the same yardsticks are used for GMR, it still scores more than 80% and hence is 
qualified. 
·  If the same yardsticks are used for other bidders, they will not score more than 80% and 
hence are not qualified. 
The GETE suggested the following as the way forward: 
·  There is no need to scrap the current process or invite fresh bids. 
·  The GMR financial bid for both the airports to be opened and the airport with best 
advantage to the country be awarded. 
·  The other airport needs to be taken up for restructuring and modernization through a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) route on the lines of DMRC. AAI equity should not be 
more than 50% in this SPV, which could tie up with foreign airport operators. 
The CoS endorsed the recommendation of GETE of disqualifying the Reliance-ASA bid. 
The  Delhi  airport  would  be  taken  up  for  development  by  GMR  on  priority  due  to  the 
Commonwealth Games in 2010. The Mumbai airport may be included in the next round of 
bids  along  with  Chennai  and  Kolkata.  It  was  also  noted  that  each  bidder  would  have 
invested about Rs 300-400 million in preparing the bid for one airport. 
January  11,  2006:  The  EGoM  reviewed  the  CoS  recommendations,  they  sought  actual 
revised markings of all bidders from GETE.  
 
January 17, 2006: The GETE submitted their second report. Exhibit 8 gives excerpts from 
the GETE second report. As expected, while the marks for the other bidders did change, 
none other than GMR-Fraport scored more than 80%. The relative rankings based on the 
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The revised technical evaluation score summary was as given below: 
(per cent) 
S No  Name of  the Bidder 
Management Capability 
Development Capability 
Pre GETE  Post GETE 
 
Delhi Airport 
1  Reliance-ASA  80.9  74.8  81.0 
2  GMR-Fraport  84.7  81.7  80.1 
3  DS Construction-Munich  73.1  73.3  70.5 
4  Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  53.5  61.9 
5  Essel-TAV  37.6  40.4  41.4 
 
Mumbai Airport 
1    Reliance-ASA   81.0  74.8  80.2 
2  GMR-Fraport   84.7  81.7  92.7 
3  DS Construction-Munich   73.1  73.3  54.7 
4  Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  53.5  65.1 
5  Essel-TAV    35.5  38.3  29.4 
6  GVK-ACSA  76.0  73.0  59.3 
  [Source: ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports 
Authority of India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913. http://www.indlaw.com accessed 
on January 15, 2007] 
 
January 24, 2006: As the EGoM gathered to decide on the airports modernization project, 
the stakes were going up. The traffic had grown in a better than expected manner during the 
past two years (Exhibit 9). The outcome of this project would have significant implications 
for future airport and general infrastructure development projects. 
 
6.  EGoM’s Decision and the Subsequent Events 
 
On  January  24,  the  EGoM  met  and  took  various  decisions.  These  were  announced  by 
MoCA/AAI on January 31, 2006
12:  
·  GMR-Fraport is the only technically qualified bidder for both the airports 
·  Financial bids of the top four technical bidders will be opened 
·  GMR-Fraport is given the choice of selecting the airport subject to matching the 
highest financial bid since they are the only technically qualified bidder. 
·  The  other  airport  (not  chosen  by  GMR-Fraport)  will  be  awarded  to  the  highest 
financial bidder amongst the three bidders. This is essential because the government 
can’t  afford  to  wait  for  another  bidding  process  which  is  time  consuming. 




                                                 
12Communication from GMR, 2006  
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The financial bids were opened on January 31, 2006.  
Per cent 






Pre GETE  Post GETE 
Delhi Airport                                                                                                                                              
1  Reliance-ASA  80.9  74.8  81.0  45.99 
2  GMR-Fraport  84.7  81.7  80.1  43.64 
3  DS Construction-Munich  73.1  73.3  70.5  40.15 
4  Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  53.5  61.9  37.04 
5  Essel-TAV  37.6  40.4  41.4  Bid not opened 
Mumbai Airport                                                                                                                                         
1    Reliance-ASA   81.0  74.8  80.2  21.33 
2  GMR-Fraport   84.7  81.7  92.7  33.03 
3  DS Construction-Munich   73.1  73.3  54.7  28.12 
4  Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP  57.0  53.5  65.1  Bid not opened 
5  Essel-TAV    35.5  38.3  29.4  Bid not opened 
6  GVK-ACSA  76.0  73.0  59.3  38.70 
[Source: ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs Airports 
Authority of India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913, http://www.indlaw.com (accessed 
on January 15, 2007)] 
On January 31, the following decisions were made: 
·  GMR-Fraport chose Delhi airport and matched the highest bid of Reliance ASA. 
·  GMR-Fraport was selected for Delhi airport 
·  Mumbai airport was awarded to GVK-ACSA. 
EGoM approved the selection of GMR-Fraport for Delhi and GVK-ACSA for Mumbai and 
forwarded it to the Cabinet for approval. 
 
Reaction of the Losing Bidder 
 
Based on the EGoM decision, Reliance Airport Developers Private Limited filed a writ 
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Delhi on February 2, 
2006. They made the following allegations against AAI and the Union of India13: 
 
“i.  An arbitrary decision making process which was discriminatory in practice was 
adopted for awarding the contract. 
 
ii.  The rule of law and all norms governed by it were violated, in the haste to meet a 
perceived, imaginary and self imposed deadline for awarding the contract with 
complete  impunity  and  State  Largesse  was  distributed  without  any  regard  to 
fairness or to the public interest.  
 
iii.  An open and transparent procedure for the evaluation and consideration of the 
tenders  was  not  followed  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of  evaluation  were 
                                                 
13 Petition excerpted from a document provided by GMR. Content has been modified for easier reading in 
terms of terminology and format.  
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changed on an ad hoc basis, only to exclude the Petitioner and favour the GVK 
Industries Ltd. 
 
iv.  The report given by the EC/Advisors named in the tender were rejected/reviewed 
for no reason, in violation of the terms of the tender. A procedure alien to the 
tender  process  was  adopted  without  any  basis  in  law,  by  constituting  a 
committee  to  review  the  evaluation  of  the  experts  in  regard  of  the  technical 
qualification. The process of the re-evaluation committee was also in violation of 
the principles of natural justice and vitiated by arbitrariness and discrimination, 
as only the bid of the Petitioner was re-evaluated and neither the procedure nor 
the final report was disclosed to the Petitioner. Further, there was no justification 
for  repeated  evaluations  when  the  evaluation  process  had  been  thoroughly 
undertaken.  
 
v.  No reasons were cited/recorded in writing for departing from the terms of the 
tender. 
 
vi.  Two yardsticks were followed in evaluating the bids. In the case of the Delhi 
airport, where the Petitioner was technically qualified and its financial bid was 
the highest, GMR Infrastructure Ltd was allowed to match the highest bidder. 
Assuming  that  the  methodology  of  giving  preference  to  technically  qualified 
bidder in awarding the airport was correct, the same methodology should have 
been applied in the case of Mumbai airport as well. Instead, the Petitioner who 
was  technically  the  most  qualified  bidder  for  Mumbai  was  not  even  given  a 
chance  to  meet  the  highest  financial  bid  as  was  done  in  favour  of  GMR 
Infrastructure Ltd for the Delhi airport. Thus there was a complete depart from 
the procedure adopted for the award of the Delhi airport, on the basis of the 
technical capability of the bidders, in respect of the Mumbai airport. 
 
vii. The procedure followed in opening the financial bid was illegal and suffered from 
irregularity and arbitrariness. No declared or transparent procedure was followed 
and the decision making process was varied on an ad hoc basis, at the whim and 
fancies of the authorities. 
 
viii.  The  key  strategic  objectives  of  world  class  development  and  expansion  and 
world  class  airport  management  were  ignored  in  determining  the  successful 
bidder for Mumbai airport.” 
 
The Court’s Decision 
 
A division bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on April 21, 2006, on the 
primary  ground  that  the  EGoM  had  absolute  discretion  in  the  matter  of  choosing  the 
modalities. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court on April 24, 2006.  
 
The Supreme Court also dismissed the petition on November 07, 2006. 
 
7. Lessons Learned 
 
A lot of thought should be given to the RFP including the bid structure, constitution of 
committees and contingency planning (especially if none or only one had qualified).   
 
 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 19  W.P.  No.  2007-05-01 
 
While  the  bid  structure  was  reasonably  detailed,  it  still  did  not include  factors  like  the 
development of an integrated terminal (between arrival and departure, different airlines, 
domestic and international and with other modes). The weightages of sub-factors had not 
been specified, leading to debates on whether they should be weighted equally or based on 
‘perceived’  importance.  Minimum  thresholds  were  not  clearly  specified  in  all  cases  as 
mandatory. The scoring scale between the threshold and the maximum was left open.  
 
The  constitution  of  one  of  the  committees  was  criticized  on  the  grounds  of  conflict  of 
interest. The creation of additional committees was also criticized, since a prior thought out 
process was not specified.  
 
While the RFP had envisaged ties in the outcome of the bid, it had not recognized the 
situation of none or one qualifying. Unfortunately, this is what happened, leading to EGoM 
having to use its power of ‘absolute discretion’.  
 
Norms during the bidding process need to be specified and complied with. Adherence to 
deadlines, responsibility of the bidders in identifying and bringing to notice deficiencies in 
the bid document during pre bid meetings, discretion on the part of bidders in independently 
communicating  with  sensitive  stakeholders  (decision  makers,  media  etc),  and  deciding 
modifications in the evaluation by the EC, if essential, prior to opening of the bids would be 
examples.  
 
The learning raises a few questions, sensitivity to which may be more important than having 
a specific answer.  
 
Questions specific to this bid: 
 
-  Should the GETE report have been accepted, especially since it revises the Reliance 
score to below cut off? 
 
-  Should GMR have been given a choice? Or should they have been given the airport 
where there would have been the best value for GoI on opening the financial bids? 
(GMR’s choice of Delhi airport effectively got Reliance out of the bid). 
 
-  Should  GMR,  while  being  given  the  choice,  have  been  asked  to  match  the  highest 
financial bid? What if the financial bid among the top four had been significantly higher 
than GMR’s? 
 
-  Should  the  “other”  airport  have  been  re-tendered?  What  are  the  implications  of  re-
tendering? 
 
-  For the “other” airport, should the opportunity to match the highest financial bid have 
been  given  in  order  of  the  technical  rank  rather  than  treating  all  above  50%/top  4 
equally? 
 
-  If a key criteria for the EGoM was to come up with a framework by which no winning 
bid for a specific airport should be known apriori, to avoid possible accusations of bias, 
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Questions in general: 
 
-  Is  there  a  danger  of  over  determination  in  the  contractual  parameters?  (One  of  the 
interested parties with rich experience walked out of the bidding process due to their not 
getting a satisfactory answer on how some of the parameters would be monitored and 
penalized for non-compliance). This would also depend on the state of maturity of the 
sector. 
 
-  Is  the  pool  of  bidders  being  restricted  by  requirements  such  as  Foreign  Direct 
Investment caps, a foreign player having to be a constituent of the bid consortia, and 
limits  on  airline  participation?  These  issues,  however,  need  to  be  examined  in  the 
broader context of the national policy on foreign exchange flows, ability to bring in new 
technology and processes, and scope economies between airlines and airports versus 
conflict  of  interest,  respectively.  In  the  latter  case,  the  maritime  sector  in  India  has 
permitted bids for container terminals both by shipping lines and by the then monopoly 
container rail operator. What are appropriate requirements for pre qualifying bidders?  
 
-  Is economic regulation required, especially for tariff setting of aeronautical charges? 
 
-  What are the implications for the next round of airport privatization bids? What are the 
implication for the privatization process in other infrastructure sectors?  
 
-  In this context, are revenue shares of 30-50 % as in the airport bid sustainable? Are 
these reflective of early entrant strategies? 
 
In conclusion, with this privatization process, India has managed to do what many other 
countries in the world have not yet attempted, but would like to do. This is all the more 
significant, given that the privatization is of the airports of the political and commercial 
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Exhibit 1 
 
Committees Involved in the Bidding Process  
 
 
1.  Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) 
 
Constituted by NDA Government on September 11, 2003. EGoM was reconstituted on June 15, 




·  Decisions on key issues 




·  Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence (Chair) 
·  Hans Raj Bhardwaj, Minister of Law & Justice 
·  P Chidambaram, Minister of Finance 
·  Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce & Industry 
·  Praful Patel, Minister of State (Independent Charge) of the MoCA 
 
2.  Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) 
 




·  Bureaucratic team overseeing the transaction 
·  Debate key issues with representative of various ministries 




·  V Subramanian, Additional Secretary & Financial Advisor, MoCA (Chair) 
·  P K Basu, JS, Department of Disinvestment, Ministry of Finance 
·  P K Deb, Joint Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance 
·  L Ramalingam, Chairman, AAI 
·  V D V Prasad Rao, Member (Finance), AAI 
·  O P Shukla, Joint Secretary & Legal Advisor, Ministry of Law & Justice 
·  S N A Zaidi, Joint Secretary, MoCA 
 
3.  Evaluation Committee (EC) 
 




·  Originate transaction structure 
·  Pre-qualification criteria 
·  Co-ordination with bidders 
·  Finalize transaction structure and invite bids 
·  Negotiate with bidders and finalize documents 
·  Move final documents for appropriate GoI approvals  
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·  V K Kalra, Executive Director - Key Infrastructure Division, AAI. 
·  ABN Amro (FC) 
Michael Lambert, MD  
  Manikkan S, Director 
·  Air Plan (GTA) 
  Rajesh Srivastava, Country Director 
  John Rogers, Program Director 
·  AMSS (LC) 
 
4.  Government Review Committee (GRC) 
 








·  Additional Secretary & Financial Adviser, MoCA (Chair) 
·  Chairman, AAI 
·  Executive Director, KID-AAI 
·  Joint Secretary, MoCA 
·  Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
·  Member (Finance), AAI 
·  Member (Planning), AAI 
·  SRO  (Infrastructure), PC 
 
5.  Committee of Secretaries (CoS) 
 








·  B K Chaturvedi, Cabinet Secretary (Chair) 
·  Rakesh Mohan, Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs  
·  Ajay Prasad, Secretary, MoCA  
·  Rajeeva Ratna Shah, Member Secretary, PC  
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6.  Group of Eminent Technical Experts (GETE) 
 




·  Overall validation of the evaluation process, including calibration of the qualifying cut-off and 
sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis will cover the impact of inter-se weightages of sub-
criteria as well as scoring. 
·  The issues raised by the Members of IMG about the evaluation process 
·  An  overall  technical  assessment  of  transparency  and  fairness  of  the  evaluation  process, 
including steps required, if any, to achieve a transparent and fair outcome 




·  E Sreedharan, MD, DMRC (Chair) 
·  R Sivadasan, Finance Commissioner, Ministry of Railways 
·  Satendra Singh, Director General of Civil Aviation 
 
[Source: Communication from GMR, 2006] 
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Exhibit 2 
 
Government Objectives and Decisions, and Bid Structure 
GoI has a number of key and other objectives in relation to the airports. 
 
Key Transaction Objectives 
 
GoI key transaction objectives are: 
 
·  World Class Development and Expansion 
Ensure world class phased development and expansion such that the new JVC’s meet their 
commitments through the timely provision of high quality airport infrastructure (on both the 
airside and landside) to meet the growing demand. 
 
·  World Class Airport Management 
Ensure the creation of world class airport management systems that are implemented in a 
timely manner through the selection of serious, committed successful bidders with suitable 
operational  expertise,  managerial  and  financial  capability,  financial  commitment  and  the 
commitment to provide quality airport services. 
 
Other Transaction Objectives 
 
In addition to the key transaction objectives, other transaction objectives include: 
 
·  Timely completion and certainty of closure, with minimal residual risks 
·  Smooth transition of operations, under concession agreements 
·  Appropriate  regulation  -  achieving  economic  regulation  of  aeronautical  assets  that  is  fair, 
commercially  and  economically  appropriate,  transparent,  predictable,  consistent  and  stable 
while protecting the interests of users and ensuring that the airports are operated in accordance 
with world standards 
·  Fair and equitable treatment of AAI employees, including preservation of accrued entitlements 
·  Diversity  of  ownership  between  Delhi  and  Mumbai  airports,  to  enhance  competition, 
encourage innovation and allow competitive benchmarking 
 
The GoI’s key and other transaction objectives will form part of the EOI and bid evaluation criteria. 
The GoI reserves the right to vary these objectives. 
 




Each prospective bidder must have a networth in excess of Rs 5,000 million as per the most recent 
audited accounts. In the event that the prospective bidder is a consortium, the combined net worth of 
only the Prime Members shall be considered. 
 
Lead Member of the Consortium 
 
In the event that the prospective bidder is a consortium, each consortium must nominate a lead 
member who would be the authorized representative of the consortium. Entities will be prohibited 
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Entities in a Disqualified Consortium 
 
Entities of a consortium that has been disqualified (except Entity(ies) who have been disqualified for 
probity, security or related reasons) at the EOI stage can participate with a PQB subject to prior 
written approval of AAI. Notwithstanding any such written approval, such changes should not affect 
the quality and operational capability of the PQB. 
 
Airport Operator   
 
Each prospective bidder must be an airport operator or have at least one airport operator in its 
consortium. 
 
Airport  operators  will  be  required,  at  the  least,  to  enter  into  a  service  performance  contract 
acceptable to AAI. Additional weighting will be given to prospective bidders with airport operators 






AAI has decided to impose cross-ownership restrictions between Delhi and Mumbai airports, which 
will preclude: 
 
(a)  Any common ownership by successful bidders with common prime members throughout the 
term of the concession period 
(b)  Any common ownership or common involvement by an airport operator via participation 
through a service performance contract 
 
Interested parties may lodge an EOI for both Delhi and Mumbai airports. If pre-qualified for both 




Equity  ownership  in  the  JVCs  by  scheduled  airlines,  cargo  airlines  and  their  group  entities  is 
restricted to 5%. However, group entities of scheduled airlines and cargo airlines that are existing 




The JVC will be subject to a 74% foreign ownership limit as per the prevailing FDI guidelines on 




The successful bidder or the entities in its consortium (where applicable) will be subject to a suitable 




AAI intends the selection of joint venture partners for the transactions to be through an international 
competitive bidding process. The expected bid structure and an indicative timetable are set out 
below. AAI currently contemplate that the bidding for both the airports will be run on a broadly 
concurrent basis. However, AAI reserves the right to change the structure and timing of any aspect 
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Stage 1 - EOI (February - June 2004) 
 
Stage 1 of the bid process comprises: 
 
·  Notifying entities of the commencement of the EOI stage 
·  Obtaining non-binding EOIs from Interested parties 
·  Shortlisting prospective bidders for inclusion in the next stage of the bid process 
 
Prospective bidders will be short-listed for inclusion in the next stage of the bid process based on 
information  provided  in  their  EOI.  The  selection  of  PQB  will  be  on  the  basis  of  pre-decided 
evaluation  criteria.  In  shortlisting  PQB,  AAI  will  have  regard  to  the  relative  quality  of  each 
candidate  and  its  prospective  capacity  and  commitment  to  satisfy  GoI’s  stated  key  and  other 
transaction objectives and any other matters which AAI considers relevant. 
 
Stage 2 - RFP (June - August 2004) 
 
Stage 2 will involve the preparation and lodgement of full, legally binding bids by PQB shortlisted 
from Stage 1. 
 
The main steps in Stage 2 are: 
 
·  Notification to PQB of Stage 2 selection 
·  Execution of confidentiality deeds by PQB 
·  Interaction with PQB 
·  Issue of detailed information memoranda, RFP and draft documentation 
·  Provision of business, traffic and legal review data (possibly in CD ROM form) together with 
possible updated information 
·  AAI/MoCA airport management and head office presentations 
·  Airport site visits 
·  Possible technical site inspections 
·  Limited written question and answer process 
·  Discussions with regulatory authorities 
·  Pre-bid confirmation of acceptance of draft documentation 
·  Lodgement of Stage 2 bids 
 
Stage 2 bids will be required to be legally binding. 
 
It is currently anticipated that Stage 2 bids will be required to be lodged in August 2004. 
 
Finalization of the Transactions 
 
AAI’s intention is to finalize the transactions for both the airports as soon as possible following the 
lodgement and review of Stage 2 offers. Accordingly, AAI will be seeking maximum certainty, 
clarity and unconditionality in the bids lodged.  
 
AAI’s  overall  objective  is  to  complete  the  transaction  for  both  the  airports  by  not  later  than 
September, 2004. 
 
[Source: ITREOI, AAI (2004). ”Restructuring and Modernization of Delhi and Mumbai Airports -
Invitation to Register an Expression of Interest,” Airport Authority of India, February 17, 2004]  
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•  Strong policy commitment to privatization and structural reforms 
•  Indian macroeconomic indicators are sound with real gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
expected between 7.5 and 8.0% in 2003-04
2, low inflation and interest rates, stable currency 
and a comfortable balance of payments situation. 
•  Certain features of economic growth indicate that the strong Compounded Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) of 6.2% in air traffic (as measured by aircraft movements) over the past 5 years 
is expected to continue: 
o  Rapidly growing international trade and investment 
o  Increasing share of industry and services in GDP 
o  Fast growing leisure travel market 
•  Delhi and Mumbai are trophy hub airport assets and international gateways, accounting for 
49% of passenger traffic and 59% of cargo traffic handled by airports in India in the financial 
year ending March 31, 2003 
•  Both airports benefit from large catchment areas and the respective regions served by the 
airports are popular tourist destinations which have exhibited rapid growth 
•  A long term concession with the possible extension of such concession period 
•  Significant potential to increase efficiencies and non-aeronautical revenues 
•  Opportunity to acquire 74% stake in each airport company 
•  No restrictions on foreign ownership of the 74% stake on offer to private partners 
 
Indian Macroeconomic Scenario 
 
During the 1990s, successive Indian governments pursued wide-ranging reforms aimed at economic 
and financial liberalization. Structural reforms included tax reform and a reduction in the role of 
government in key industry and service sectors. Over the last few years, a number of public sector 
units have been privatized. Certain key sectors (telecommunications, banking, insurance) are no 
longer public monopolies and private/ foreign competition has been allowed. 
 
The Indian economy has progressively become more open. Import licensing for most capital and 
intermediate goods has been abolished and that for manufactured consumer goods and agricultural 
products has been removed in stages. With the exception of agricultural tariffs, unweighted average 
tariffs  have  shown  a  sharp  decline.  India  has  gradually  been  moving  towards  current  account 
convertibility while maintaining controls on the capital account. The financial sector has seen far 
reaching banking and capital market reform. In the current financial year, investments by foreign 
institutional investors has, till date, already exceeded twice the highest inflow previously recorded. 
 
Reforms have paid off as key indicators show healthy growth in the industrial and services sectors, 
low inflation and interest rates, strong balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves with 
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Source: “India: Sustaining Reform, Reducing Poverty,” The World Bank, July 2003 
 
Political consensus  underpins further  liberalization  of  the  economy.  If  growth  enabling  policies 
remain in place, the global economic landscape could alter fundamentally as developing economies 
like India become a major force. With a relatively large proportion of  its population in the working 
age group, India’ s favorable demographics will allow it to generate the savings and investment rates 
required to drive growth. The more favourable environment and prospects for the Indian economy is 
encouraging globally focused companies to increase their involvement with India. With the entry of 
multinationals in the Indian market, there is now little distinction between domestic success and 
global success. Successful Indian firms are looking to increase their share of global markets via both 
organic and inorganic growth strategies. Surging economic growth has had a direct impact on air 
traffic (aircraft movements) which has grown at a CAGR of 6.2% over the last 5 years. This is 
expected to continue as domestic and international traffic and cargo growth over 2002-03 to 2006-07 
is forecast to be 5-7.5% per annum
3. 
 
Civil Aviation Sector Reform 
 
The civil aviation sector currently has two policies viz. the Domestic Air Transport Policy
4 and the 
Policy on Airport Infrastructure of 1997
5. The Domestic Air Transport Policy removed barriers to 
entry  of  private  airlines  in  domestic  air  transport.  Foreign  equity  participation  up  to  40%  was 
allowed, with no direct or indirect participation from foreign airlines. For cargo airlines, India has an 
open  skies  policy  and  all  foreign  airlines  are  allowed  to  operate  cargo  services  without  any 
restrictions.  The  Policy  on  Airport  Infrastructure  sets  out  objectives  for  development  of  airport 
infrastructure and private sector participation. Foreign equity participation in airports is allowed up 
to 74% with automatic approval, and up to 100% with special permission.  
 
In 2003 the MoCA constituted a committee to review the institutional and regulatory framework 
governing the civil aviation sector. The first report submitted by the committee in November 2003 
has laid out a draft Civil Aviation Policy
6 which is under consideration. 
 
Legislative and Regulatory Framework 
 
The civil aviation sector in India is governed by two acts of Parliament: (a) the Aircraft Act 1934 
provides for the control of the manufacture, possession, use, operation, sale, import and export of 
aircraft; and (b) the AAI Act 1994 provides for the constitution of AAI and the vesting of the 
airports in AAI. 
 
Aviation oversight functions are currently distributed between the MoCA
7, AAI, DGCA, and BCAS. 
(The appendix to this exhibit gives further details.) MoCA is responsible for the formulation of 
national policies and programmes for development and regulation of Civil Aviation and for devising 
and implementing schemes for orderly growth and expansion of civil air transport, its functions also  
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extend to overseeing the provision of airport facilities, air traffic services and carriage of passengers 
and goods by air. 
 
The DGCA is the principal regulatory body in the field of Civil Aviation and is responsible for 
regulation of air transport services to/from/within India and for formulation and enforcement of civil 
air regulations, air safety, and airworthiness standards. It also co-ordinates all regulatory functions 
with the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
 
The  BCAS  is  responsible  for  laying  down  the  standards  of  pre-embarkation  security  and  anti-
sabotage measures in respect of civil flights in India, as well as monitoring the enforcement of the 
security  measures. Actual enforcement on the ground is entrusted to the respective State/Union 
Territory Police and Central Industrial Security Force. 
 
AAI undertakes to administer and manage airports and civil enclaves where air transport services are 
operated, all aeronautical communication stations, and all incidental matters. Domestic air transport 
services are provided by Indian Airlines and private domestic airlines and international air transport 
services are provided by Air India and Indian Airlines (on select routes) and foreign airlines.  
 
In  accordance  with  the  Civil  Aviation  Sector  Reform  programme,  it  is  also  proposed  that  an 
independent economic regulator will be established for the sector. 
 
Overview of AAI 
 
AAI,  an  undertaking  of the  GoI,  was  formed  on April  01,  1995,  under  the  AAI  Act,  1994  by 
merging  the  National  Airports  Authority  and  the  International  Airports  Authority  of  India. 
Currently, it manages 11 international airports, 83 domestic civil airports, and 28 civil passenger 
enclaves at defence airfields. In addition, it also controls the entire Indian airspace (excluding the 
special user airspace) and provides Air Traffic Control Services over it and adjoining oceanic areas. 
 
During the financial year ending March 31, 2003, AAI airports together handled almost 44 million 
passengers, 982,000 million tons cargo, and 561,000 aircraft movements. In the same year, AAI is 
estimated to have registered revenues of `23.85 billion (US$ 518 million
8) with an Earnings before 
Interest Tax and Depreciation/Amortization (EBITDA) margin of 36%. At March 31, 2003, it had 
total assets of `54.50 billion (US$ 1.19 billion) at a debt equity ratio of 0.10. 
 
The  bulk  of  AAI's  revenues  accrue  from  the  collection  of  route  navigation  facilities  charges, 
landing, housing & parking charges, terminal navigational landing charges, and cargo charges at its 
airports.  In  addition  to  these  charges,  a  passenger  service  fee  per  embarking  passenger  is  also 
recovered.  Non-aeronautical  revenues  have  considerable  potential  for  growth  as  the  average 
passenger spend at duty free shops at Indian airports is considered to be much lower than the global 
average. 
 
AAI,  MoCA,  and  State  Governments  have  been  exploring  alternatives  for 
development/modernization of major airports through private sector participation. The concession 
agreement for the greenfield Bangalore International Airport with a private consortium including 
Siemens Project Ventures, Flughafen Zuerich, and Larsen & Toubro is expected to be executed in 




Delhi is the national capital of India and is located in north India. It is the financial and commercial 
hub of northern India and the location of most foreign embassies. It is also the Indian headquarters 
of a number of global corporations such as Coca Cola, General Motors, GE, Honda, Mobil-Exxon, 
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Spread over an area of 22 sq km, the Indira Gandhi International Airport (IATA code DEL) is 
situated on the southern outskirts of the city, approximately 15 km from the city center. It offers 
excellent opportunities for development and expansion. The airport serves as the major international 
gateway for the northern and north-western parts of India which are particularly attractive tourist 
destinations (e.g. Rajasthan, Delhi-Agra-Jaipur circuit). In the financial year ending March 31, 2003, 
it accounted for 21% of passenger movements and 28% of cargo handled by airports in India. 
 
Domestic flights link the city to all the metropolitan cities and many other cities in the country. 
International  flights  link  Delhi  to  various  international  destinations  such  as  London,  Dubai, 
Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  Amsterdam,  Frankfurt,  and  New  York.  According  to  the  winter  2003 
schedule, the airport is served by 49 international airlines and 4 domestic airlines. The airport offers 
connections to a large number of countries through 60 international flights every week. 
 
The  airport  has  two  runways  and  separate  terminal  complexes  for  domestic  and  international 
operations with the domestic complex consisting of three buildings. 
 
In the financial year ending March 31, 2003, Delhi airport handled 9.1 million passengers of which 
58% were domestic passengers and the remaining international. The total cargo traffic at Delhi 
airport in the financial year ending March 31, 2003 was approximately 276,000 tons with domestic 
cargo accounting for 28% of the total and the remaining being the share of international cargo. The 
airport offers services 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and the pattern of passenger and cargo 








During the financial year ending March 31, 2003, Delhi airport reported revenues of `3.69 billion 
(US$ 80 million), which reflects the revenue base of the JV company that will be set up to manage 
the airport. During the period 1999-00 to 2002-03, this revenue stream of Delhi airport has grown at 
a CAGR of 10.5%. During the financial year ending March 31, 2003, the airport reported EBITDA  
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of `2.21 billion (US$ 48 million) on this revenue stream, indicating an EBITDA margin of around 
60%. 
 
The main source of revenue at Delhi airport is aeronautical services contributing 42% of the total 
revenues in the financial year ending March 31, 2003. In the same year, the share of cargo revenue 




Mumbai is the capital of Maharashtra, a western state of India. It is a highly industrialized state and 
one of the leading beneficiaries of foreign and domestic investments since the onset of economic 
liberalization. Mumbai is the financial and commercial hub of India and the headquarters of most 
domestic and multinational banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies in India. The city 
is the main center for capital market related activities and is home to the country’s two largest stock 
exchanges. Most large Indian corporate houses have their headquarters based in Mumbai. Indian 
operations  of  various  multinationals  such  as  AT&T,  Daimler  Chrysler,  P&G,  and  Shell  are 
headquartered in Mumbai.  
 
Spread over an area of 7.6 sq km, the Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport (IATA code BOM) is 
located inside the city, towards the north and is conveniently connected to the rest of the city by road 
and the local rail network. The airport is the major international gateway to the industrial states of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat and is an important hub for domestic traffic. In the financial year ending 
March 31, 2003, it accounted for 28% of passenger movements and 31% of cargo handled by 
airports in India. 
 
Domestic flights link Mumbai to all the metropolitan cities and many other cities in the country. 
International  flights  link  Mumbai  to  various  international  destinations  such  as  London,  Dubai, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Sydney, Frankfurt, and New York. According to the winter 2003 schedule, 
the  airport  is  served  by  41  international  airlines  and  5  domestic  airlines.  The  airport  offers 
connections to a large number of countries through 63 international flights every week. The airport 
has two runways and separate terminal complexes for domestic and international operations. 
 
In the financial year ending March 31, 2003, Mumbai airport handled 12.3 million passengers of 
which 59% were domestic passengers and the remaining international. The total cargo traffic at 
Mumbai airport in the financial year ending March 31, 2003, was about 308,000 tons with domestic 
cargo accounting for 27% of the total and the remaining being the share of international cargo. The 
airport offers services 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and the pattern of passenger and cargo 
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Traffic has also exhibited steady growth as evidenced in the table below: 
 
 
During the financial year ending March 31, 2003, Mumbai airport reported revenues of `4.23 billion 
(US$ 92 million), which reflects the revenue base of the JV company that will be set up to manage 
the airport. During the period 1999-00 to 2002-03, this revenue stream of Mumbai airport has grown 
at a CAGR of 9.5%. During the financial year ending March 31, 2003, the airport reported EBITDA 
of `2.27 billion (US$ 49 million) on this revenue stream, indicating an EBITDA margin of 54%. 
 
The main source of revenue at Mumbai airport is aeronautical services contributing 50% of the total 
revenues in the financial year ending March 31, 2003. In the same year, the share of cargo revenue
9 
was 18% while commercial and other revenues accounted for the remaining 32%. 
 
Appendix: Key Functions and Major Participants in the Civil Aviation Sector 
 
Functionality  Organization  Specific Functions 
Civil aviation policy and 
regulation 
MCA  -  Administers the legislative 
framework for the sector  
-  Drafts legislative proposals and 
regulations  
-  Provides advice to the GOI on 
developments and changes for 
the sector  
-  Administrative oversight over 
public sector  
-  organizations in the sector 
including DGCA, Bureau of 
Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) 
and AAI  
-  Implementation of bilateral air 
services agreements with foreign 
countries  
-  Economic regulation 
Regulatory standards and 
licensing 
DGCA  -  Air safety regulation  
-  Administration of International 
Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) standards  
-  Licensing of airports, air carriers, 
pilots  
-  Approval to operate scheduled 
air transport services on a new or 
altered route  
-  Approval of airline schedules  
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Functionality  Organization  Specific Functions 
-  Registration of civil aircraft 
-  Investigation into air accidents 
and incidents 
Airport infrastructure and 
services 
AAI  -  Manages, designs, constructs, 
operates and maintains 126 
airports  
-  Provision of passenger 
facilitation and information 
systems  
-  Development and management 
of cargo terminals  
-  Fire fighting and emergency 
services  
-  Air field services, including 
apron management  
-  International and domestic slot 
allocation 
Security standards and  
compliance 
Bureau of Civil Aviation 
Security  
(BCAS) 
-  Establishes standards for pre 
embarkation security and anti 
sabotage measures  
-  Conducts checks for assessing 
security preparedness  
-  Undertakes training programs on 
aviation security 
Air traffic control  AAI at present, or possibly a 
separate government agency in 
the future 
-  Controls and manages the entire 
Indian airspace  
-  Operates air traffic functions en 
route and on approaches to 
airports  
-  Taxiing guidance  
-  Flight information service  
-  Alerting service, search and 
rescue co-ordination 
Air transport services 
domestic air travel 
-  Indian Airlines (100% GOI 
owned)  
-  Jet Airways  
-  Sahara  
-  Alliance Air (100% 
subsidiary of Indian 
Airlines)  
-  Air Deccan 
-  Domestic air transport services 
International Air Travel  -  Air India (100% GOI 
owned)  
-  Foreign airlines operating in 
India  
-  Indian Airlines (100% GOI 
owned)  
-  Jet Airways, Sahara (limited 
operations) 
-  International air transport 
services 
Air Cargo Services  Air cargo operators, domestic 
and international airlines 
 
Other airport services:     
Refuelling  Public sector oil companies viz.    
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Functionality  Organization  Specific Functions 
Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat 




(including self handling,  
excluding handling of  
cargo) 
Air India, Indian Airlines, Jet 
Airways, Air Sahara, Cambatta 





Air India, foreign airlines, 
Cambatta Aviation, AAI, 
Express Industries Council of 
India, DHL 
 




Immigration  Immigration Department, 
Ministry of External Affairs 
 
Plant and animal 
quarantine  
Ministry of Agriculture   
Health  Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare 
 
Security  Central Industrial Security 
Force State Police 
 
Meteorological  Indian Meteorological 
Department, Department of 
Science and Technology 
 
Operate shops at terminal  Concessionaires under contract 
with AAI 
 




[Source:  “Information  Memorandum:  Indira  Gandhi  International  Airport.”  Airport  Authority of 




2Speech of Finance Minister of the Government of India, Interim Budget 2004-05 
3“Report  of  the  Committee  on  a  Road  Map  for  the  Civil  Aviation  Sector,”  Ministry  of  Civil 
Aviation, Government of India, November 30, 2003 
4The policy can be accessed at http://civilaviation.nic.in/moca/min_idx.htm 
5The policy can be accessed at http://civilaviation.nic.in/moca/min_idx.htm 
6The draft policy can be accessed at http://civilaviation.nic.in/moca/nccommittereport.pdf 
7Website http://civilaviation.nic.in 
8Exchange rate of US$ 1 = `46 
9Unlike Delhi, Air India and AAI are together responsible for cargo handling at Mumbai airport and 
share the revenues accruing there from 
 
Source: ”Restructuring and Modernization of Delhi and Mumbai Airports -Invitation to Register an 
Expression of Interest,” Airport Authority of India, February 17, 2004]  
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Exhibit 4 
 
 Information on Bidders 
 
1.  Bharti-Changi 
 
Bharti: Bharti Enterprises had successfully focused its strategy on telecom while straddling diverse 
fields of business. From the creation of ‛Airtel,’ one of India's well known brands, to becoming the 
largest manufacturer and exporter of world class telecom terminals under its ‘Beetel’ brand, Bharti 
had created a significant position for itself in the global telecommunications sector. Bharti Airtel Ltd 
was acknowledged as one of India's successful companies, and its flagship brand Airtel, had over 31 
million customers across the length and breadth of India.  
[http://www.bharti.com (accessed on October 12, 2006)] 
 
Changi: Changi Airports International Pte Ltd (CAI), formerly known as Changi Airport 
Managers and Partners, was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Civil Aviation Authority of 
Singapore  (CAAS)  –  owner-operator  of  the  highly  acclaimed  Singapore  Changi  Airport. 
Besides enforcing high performance standards in airport operations, CAAS also regulated and 
promoted the development of air transport and adopted a vision to make Changi a global air 
hub and the world’s best airport. As its subsidiary, CAI was formed to pursue investment in 
foreign airports and offer consultancy services in the entire spectrum of civil aviation. The broad 
range of services included investment in foreign airports, providing consultancy services in airport 
development and management, and also training services to overseas airports in areas such as airport 
commercial management, operational efficiency and customer service.  
[http://www.changiairportsinternational.com/aboutus/about_us.htm  (accessed  on  October  12, 
2006)] 
 
2.  L&T-Piramal-Hochtief 
 
L&T: Founded in 1938, Larsen & Toubro Ltd (L&T) was one of Asia's largest vertically integrated 
engineering and construction conglomerates with additional interests in information technology and 
electrical business. Serving the core sectors and infrastructure of the economy, L&T had pioneered 
spectacular achievements in Indian industry. Many of the engineering and construction projects 
executed by L&T had set new benchmarks in terms of scale, sophistication and speed. So do many 
buildings, ports, highways, bridges, and civil structures around the country, which were widely 
regarded as landmarks. 
[http://www.larsentoubro.com] 
 
Piramal: The US$ 100 million Piramal Holdings Ltd built and developed shopping malls, lifestyle 
department stores and family entertainment centers. It was a part of Piramal Group. The company 
had  developed  over  3.5  million  sq  feet  of  retail,  residential  and  office  space  in  Mumbai.  The 
company had built brands such as Crossroads (retail development), Piramyd Megastore (chain of 
departmental  stores),  Piramyd  Supermarket  (food  and  grocery  retail),  Jammin  (Family 
Entertainment Center), Peninsula (office complex) and Ashok (residential development). 
[http://www.morarjeetextiles.com/shirtings/abt_piramal.htm#5 (accessed on October 14, 2006)] 
 
Hochtief: Hochtief Airport had positioned itself as one of the leading independent airport managers 
in the continuously growing market for airport privatizations. Since its foundation in 1997, it had 
acquired holdings in five large airports (Athens, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Sydney and Tirana) that 
together handled a total of over 75 million passengers a year. It had taken over operations of the 
airport  in  Tirana,  capital  of  Albania,  in  early  2005.  It  held  a  stake  in  the  UK  consulting  firm 
Transport & Logistics. It was part of the Hochtief AG group.  
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3.  Sterlite-Macquarie-ADP 
 
Sterlite:  The  flagship  company  of  Vedanta  Resources  Plc  and  a  major  global  player  in  the 
nonferrous  metals  business,  Sterlite  Industries  India  Ltd  was  a  leading  producer  of  non-ferrous 
metals in India. Sterlite had a strong presence in the Indian copper market and was also present in 
the aluminum and zinc sectors. It was one of the two leading domestic copper producers in India. 
Sterlite's copper operations included a smelter, refinery, phosphoric acid plant and copper rod plant 
at Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu, a refinery and copper rod plant at Silvassa in Dadra & Nagar Haveli and 
one copper mine in Australia.  
[http://sterlite-industries.com/index1.asp (accessed on October 18, 2006)] 
 
Macquarie: Macquarie Airports Group (MAG) was a private equity investment fund. MAG made 
equity  investments  in  airports  and  associated  infrastructure.  MAG’s  well-balanced  portfolio 
comprised interests in four airports: the large gateway airports of Rome and Sydney (Kingsford 
Smith)  and  regional (international)  airports  of  Birmingham  and  Bristol.  Altogether,  the  airports 
handled over 62 million passengers per annum. 
[http://www.macquarie.com/uk/infra/mag.htm (accessed on October 18, 2006)] 
 
ADP: Aeroports de Paris (ADP) was a French airport group. The company operated 14 hub airports 
in the Paris metropolitan area, with a combined surface area of 6,677 hectares. These included three 
commercial  airports  (Paris-Charles  de  Gaulle,  Paris-Orly,  Paris-Le  Bourget),  ten  airfields 
(Chavenay,  Chelles,  Coulommiers,  Etampes,  Lognes,  Meaux,  Persan-Beaumont,  Pontoise-
Cormeilles, Saint-Cyr and Toussus-le-Noble), and one heliport (Paris-Issy-les-Moulineaux). It also 
designed  and  supervised  the  construction  of  airports  in  other  countries.  ADP  had  several 
subsidiaries, which were involved in airport-related assistance, telecommunications, logistics and 
engineering services. These included the Alyzia group, which provided runway assistance services, 
SCI  Roissy  Sogaris,  which  managed  and  developed  the  Aeroports  de  Paris  air  freight  logistics 
centre,  and  ADP  Ingenierie,  an  engineering  company  that  provided  design,  project  design  and 
assistance services to contractors. ADP was converted from a state-owned company to a limited 
company in July 2005.   
[http://finance.google.com/finance?q=EPA:ADP (accessed on October 21, 2006)] 
 
4.  GMR-Fraport 
 
GMR: GMR group, a `25 billion business house, was one of the fastest growing infrastructure 
organizations  in  India  with  interests  in  airport,  power  and  roads.  Employing  the  public  private 
partnership (PPP) model, the group had successfully implemented several infrastructure projects in 
India. GMR Infrastructure Ltd was the holding company for all its infrastructure projects. The other 
focus area of the group was agro-business, with sugar as the main product line.  
[http://www.gmrgroup.co.in (accessed on October 21, 2006)] 
 
Fraport: Fraport AG was a German transport company. As the successful owner and operator of 
Frankfurt Airport, it was one of the leading companies in the international airport business. Fraport 
AG  held  shares  in  several  airports  around  the  world.  These  were  Frankfurt  Airport,  Antalya 
International  Airport,  Cairo  International  Airport,  Jorge  Chavez  International  Airport  Lima, 
Frankfurt Hahn Airport, Flughafen Hannover-Langenhagen and Flughafen Saarbrücken. As of 2004, 
the company had approximately 24,000 employees - about 15,000 of them in Frankfurt and an 
annual revenue of about 2 billion Euros. 
[http://www.fraport.com/cms/default/rubrik/2/2228.htm (accessed on October 21, 2006)] 
 
IDF: The third partner of the consortium was the India Development Fund (IDF). IDF, with a 
corpus of `8.5 billion, was the first fund managed by the IDFC private equity fund for infrastructure. 
IDFC  was  a  Non-Banking  Finance  Company  engaged  in  the  business  of  lending  money  for 
infrastructure  projects.  It  operated  in  three  predominant  areas:  transportation,  energy,  and 
telecommunications.  
[www.idfc.com (accessed on October 24, 2006)]  
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5.  GVK-ACSA  
 
GVK: The Hyderabad based GVK group was a US $700 million business conglomerate with a 
diversified and transnational presence. A saga that had its beginnings in the construction of the 
Nagarjuna Sagar dam in 1960s, it literally and figuratively lighted up the lives of millions of people. 
In between construction and power, the GVK conglomerate had established a proven presence in the 
fields of hospitality, petrochemicals, manufacturing, finance, and infrastructure projects and had 
ventured into the fields of life sciences, IT infrastructure, and non-conventional energy.  
[http://www.reachouthyderabad.com/business/bizbom/bom19.htm (accessed on October 24, 2006)] 
 
ACSA: Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) was formed in 1993 and operated South Africa's 
ten principal airports, including the three major international airports at O R Tambo, Cape Town and 
Durban. The other seven were domestic airports of Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, East London, 
George,  Kimberley,  Upington and Pilanesberg.  Since  1998,  ACSA had a  35-year  concession  to 
manage Pilanesberg Airport. ACSA was the largest airports authority in Africa. Together, its 10 
airports  handled  more  than  200,000  aircraft  landings  and  23  million arriving  and  departing 
passengers annually. 
[http://www.airports.co.za/home.asp?pid=940 (accessed on October 24, 2006)] 
 
6.  Reliance-ASA 
 
Reliance: The Reliance Group was India's largest business house with total revenues of over US$ 
22.6 billion. The group's activities included exploration and production of oil and gas, refining and 
marketing, petrochemicals, textiles, financial services and insurance, power, telecom and infocom 
initiatives. The group exported its products to more than 100 countries the world over. Reliance 
Group revenue was equivalent to about 3.5% of India's GDP. The group contributed nearly 10% of 
the country's indirect tax revenues and over 6% of India's exports. The Reliance Group Companies 
included:  Reliance  Industries  Ltd,  Reliance  Capital  Ltd,  Reliance  Industrial  Infrastructure  Ltd, 
Reliance Telecom Ltd, Reliance Infocomm Ltd, Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd, Indian 
Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd and Reliance Energy Ltd. 
[http://www.whatisindia.com/issues/reliance/index.html (accessed on October 24, 2006)] 
 
ASA: There were four airport groups operating in Mexico. Mexican government’s Aeropuertos y 
Servicios Auxiliares (ASA) also known as Grupo Aeroportuario ASA Corporativo and three private 
sector groups, Grupo Aeroportuario Centro-Norte, Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico, and Grupo 
Aeroportuario  del  Sureste.  ASA’s  investment  during  the  last  three  years  had  reached  US  $75 
million.  An  additional  $30  million  investment  was  underway.  ASA  expansion  and  remodeling 
projects involved seven airport terminals throughout Mexico. The projects also contemplated the 
construction of a new airport terminal in the State of Chiapas at an estimated cost of US $55 million. 
Also,  the  Mexico  City’s  airport  expansion  project  ‘Terminal  2’  would  serve  up  to  12  million 
passengers per year.  
[http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr127245e.html  (accessed  on  October  24, 
2006)] 
 
7.  DS Construction-Munich 
 
DS Construction: A pioneer in PPP infrastructure development and engineering construction in 
India, with over `90 billion of projects under execution in the highways, expressways, railways, and 
hydro power; DS Construction was actively pursuing privatization of airports and power projects, 
special economic zones (SEZs) and real estate development. The company had been accredited with 
an ISO 9001:2000 certification. With a successful track record, it had developed a capability to 
provide premier technical, management and related services to develop, manage, engineer, build, 
and operate installations for its clients. The company marked its foray in to the Hydropower sector  
 
 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 38  W.P.  No.  2007-05-01 
with the 1,000 MW project worth `50 billion in Arunachal Pradesh. It had been awarded two SEZ 
projects in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, cumulatively worth `120 billion. 
[http://dsconstructions.com/press/press3.htm (accessed on October 25, 2006)] 
 
Munich: Munich Airport was Germany's second largest airport and ranked eighth among European 
passenger  airports.  It  was  operated  by  Flughafen  München  GmbH  (FMG)  and  its  subsidiaries. 
Shareholders of FMG were the Free State of Bavaria (51%), the Federal Republic of Germany 
(26%) and the city of Munich (23%). 
[http://www.munich-airport.de/EN/Areas/Company/index.html (accessed on October 25, 2006)] 
 
8.  DLF-MANSB  
 
DLF: The DLF group had made significant progress in pursuing new business opportunities in 
hotel, infrastructure and special economic zones. DLF and Laing O’Rourke,  UK were strategic 
partners  in  several  infrastructure  projects.  Laing  O’Rourke  was  a  global  leader  in  construction 
credited with landmark projects such as the Dubai International Airport, Millennium Tower and the 
T-5 Airport Terminal in UK. Through this joint venture, the group planned construction of projects 
in  the  sectors  of  expressways  and  airports.  The  group  was  capitalizing  on  emerging  market 
opportunities to deliver high-end facilities and projects to its wide base of customers by constantly 
upgrading its internal skills and resource capabilities. In line with its expansion plans, the DLF 
Group had over 130 million sq ft of development across its businesses, including developed and on-
going projects. This comprised over 28 million sq ft of projects that the group had executed under its 
home, offices and shopping mall segments. 
[http://www.dlf-group.com/group_landing.aspx (accessed on October 25, 2006)] 
 
MANSB (Eraman): Registered as Malaysia Airports (Niaga) Sdn Bhd (MANSB), Eraman was a 
wholly  owned  subsidiary  established  in  1993  as  a  retail  arm  to  the  Malaysia  Airport  Holdings 
Berhad (MAHB). MAHB was the operator and manager of Malaysia’s 39 airports, which comprised 
international, domestic and short take-off and landing ports. As a largest airport retailer in Malaysia, 
Eraman had more than 40 outlets in four international airports across the country (KLIA, Penang, 
Kuching and Kota Kinabalu).   
[http://www.eraman-malaysia.com (accessed on October 25, 2006)] 
 
9.  Essel-TAV  
 
Essel:  Essel  Group  had  diverse  national  and  global  business  interests,  encompassing  media 
programming, broadcast & distribution, specialty packaging, entertainment, telecom, and trading; 
and  having  close  synergies  particularly  with  ventures  active  in  the  areas  of  content, 
distribution/reach, and infrastructure/logistics.   
[http://www.esselgroup.com (accessed on October 27, 2006)] 
 
TAV:  It  was  a  joint-venture  company  of  TEPE  and  AKFEN  Construction.  TEPE  Group  and 
AKFEN  Holding  were  large  Turkish  companies  with  combined  broad  interests  in  institutional, 
industrial, civil and commercial construction, industrial and commercial products manufacturing, 
facilities management, insurance, security services recreation and tourism in Turkey and abroad. 
TAV, established in 1997, was promoting and conducting new business in airport construction, 
financing, passenger terminal operations and related consulting services on an international basis. It 
invested, built and operated 1,250,000 sq m of airport facilities, hosted 42.5 million passengers per 
year, handled 53,000 aircrafts per year, and served more than 300 airline companies.  
[http://startnews.tubitak.gov.tr/ankara/presentations/16March_Session4/TAV_NazmiHugul.pdf 
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10.  Videocon-Methven Corporation 
 
Videocon: Videocon, a US$ 2.5 billion global conglomerate, was India’s leading manufacturer of 
consumer electronics and white goods. The group operated through four key sectors: consumer 
durables, colour picture tubes, CRT glass, and oil & gas.  
[http://www.videoconworld.com (accessed on October 27, 2006)] 
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5  Evaluation of Stage 2 Offers 
5.1  Overview of Evaluation Process 
 
This section sets out the approach that will be applied by AAI and its advisers when evaluating 
offers. General guidance in relation to the relative importance of each of the criteria and certain 
tender requirements are set out below. 
 
The approach to be followed will be undertaken in four phases as set out in summary form in the 
table below: 
Phase 
   
Explanation 
1  Assessment of Mandatory 
Requirement  
  Any  bidder  not  meeting  the 
mandatory  requirement  will  have  its 
offer  removed  from  further 
consideration 







2  Assessment of Financial 
Commitment 
  Debt  and  equity  commitment  are 
specified at Appendix A is evaluated 
and  offers  not  meeting  the 
requirement are excluded from further 
consideration 




   
3  ￿  Management Capability, 
Commitment and Value 
Add 
￿  Development Capability, 
Commitment and Value 
Add 
  All remaining offers are assessed on 
technical pre-qualification criteria and 
only  those  assessed  with  technical 
pre-qualification  on  each  of  the  two 
criteria  of  80%  or  more  proceed  to 
phase 4 
   
 
 
   
4  Assessment of Financial 
Consideration 
  The  offer  of  the  bidder  with  the 
highest financial consideration for the 
airport  is  selected  as  the  successful 
bidder 
 




                                                 
1Modified for easier reading  
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5.2  Mandatory Requirement 
 
The mandatory requirements for stage 2 offers are as follows: 
 
￿  Confirmation of acceptance for final transaction documents 
￿  Confirmation that the net worth criteria of the bidder as per the requirement in the ITREOI 
document continues to be fulfilled. 
￿  No consortium member or group entity of a consortium member or nominated airport operator is 
participating in more than one consortium bidding for the same airport 
￿  Consortium has an airport operator who has relevant and significant experience of operating, 
managing and developing airports 
￿  Confirm that the offer is capable of acceptance anytime during the bid period 
￿  Confirm that the offer commits the offer or to the mandatory capital projects and the initial 
development plan is in accord with the development planning principles and the traffic forecasts 
(It is to be noted that traffic forecasts are only the base level forecasts) 
￿  Equity ownership in the joint venture company by a scheduled airline and their group entities, 
subject to the exemption of group entities that are existing airport operators 
￿  FDI in the JVC does not exceed 49% 
￿  Minimum equity ownership by Indian entities (other than AAI/GoI public sector entities) in the 
JVC is 25% 
￿  Provision of suitable probity and security statements 
￿  Lodgement of offer that incorporates all the material required as set out in Appendices A to E, 
inclusive, in this document 
￿  Submission of bid bond 
 
AAI reserves the right to clarify with bidders any matters set out in the offer, including mandatory 
requirements, but will accept no additional material additions to the offer already submitted beyond 
that material directly relevant to the matter or matters being clarified. 
 
5.3  Assessment of Financial Commitment 
 
There is a requirement that the external funding of aeronautical developments at the airport can not 
be secured against the land and aeronautical assets. It is essential that bidders who proceed through 
the evaluation process and are assessed as possible JV partners for AAI have the capability to fund 
the required development of the airport, having regard to the limitation on security for lending for 
the project. 
 
In order to evidence this there are two requirements: 
 
￿  The consortium members provide written commitment from their ultimate holding company that 
the  level  of  equity  funding  required  from  their  subsidiaries  for  the  first  seven  years  of  the 
implementation  of  the  initial  development  plan  is  guaranteed.  Each  member  shall  separately 
certify its equity commitment and the consortium members as a group shall provide a joint and 
several undertaking the full equity requirement is committed by each member of the consortium. 
 
￿  Committed bank lending must be available for the level of debt required for the first seven years 
of the implementation of the initial development plan duly evidenced by commitment letters from 
lenders setting out the agreed terms and conditions. 
 
Any offers that do not meet these requirements will be excluded from further consideration. 
 
Bidders should note that they will need to have put in place suitable arrangements to support their 
joint and several commitment of equity with a bank guarantee to the same level which will be  
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required to be provided by the selected JV partners of the successful bidder at or prior to effective 
date. 
5.4  Assessment of Technical Pre-Qualification 
 
The technical pre-qualification is based on two global pre-qualification criteria. 
 
￿  Management Capability, Commitment and Value Add 
￿  Development Capability, Commitment and Value Add 
 
Each  of  these  is  assessed  in  terms  of  a  set  of  pre-qualification  criteria  and  supporting  pre-
qualification factors that are detailed in the section 5.6. 
 
The purpose of the technical pre-qualification phase is to ensure that only those bidders that can 
address the GoI’s strategic objectives are evaluated at the final phase of the evaluation process and 
that  only  bidders  satisfying  the  benchmark  of  80%  under  the  technical  pre-qualification 
requirements are allowed into the final phase of evaluation. 
 
A scoring system will be applied based on the assessment of the evaluation terms of the offer against 
the technical pre-qualification criteria. Each of the two global pre-qualification criteria is assessed 
out of a possible 100 marks. The assessment is on an absolute basis not relative as between the 
offers. Hence there is no predetermined number of offers that will be considered in the final phase. 
 
5.5  Assessment of Financial Consideration 
 
The final phase of the assessment process is the financial consideration. 
 
Offers are sought on the basis of an annual OMDA fee payable as a percentage of gross revenue, 
aeronautical and non-aeronautical. 
 
A minimum OMDA fee of 5% of gross revenue has been set, which will be subject to bidding. 
Where the same bidder is the highest bidder for each of CSIA and IGIA, noting the cross ownership 
restriction, the selection of the successful bidder for the airport will be on the basis that the highest 
bidder will be declared as the successful bidder for that airport wherein the margin (computed solely 
as the difference between the % numbers) between the highest offer and the second best offer is the 
most. Accordingly, the successful bidder for other airport shall be the bidder with the second best 
offer for that airport provided that bidder is willing to match the highest bidder for that airport. 
 
Further, where the same bidder is the highest bidder for each CSIA and IGIA and that the margin 
between the highest offer and the second best offer for each of CSIA and IGIA is the same, then the 
highest bidder will be declared as the successful bidder for that airport where its offer is the highest. 
The successful bidder for the other airport shall be the bidder with the second best offer for that 
airport provided that bidder is willing to match the highest bidder for that airport. 
 
In the event that there are two or more bidders for the airport with the same offers, then preferences 
would be given in the order of the following: (a) level of equity holding of the airport operator (b) 
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5.6  Technical Pre-Qualification Criteria and Factors 
 
This section sets out the pre-qualification criteria and pre-qualification factors that will be used to 
access each of the two global pre-qualification factors (sub-factors). 
 
A  Criteria: Management Capability, Commitment and Value Add 
 
Sub-Criteria (i): Management Capability  
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Experience of the nominated airport operator (weightage: 25) 
 
Each of the following to be supported by documented case studies and relevant statistics (PAX and 
cargo statistics for each airport nominated) 
 
1.1.1  Number, scale and geographic diversity of airports operated and managed by the airport 
operator with substantial domestic, international and cargo operations including specific role 
of the airport operator in respect of each of these operations 
1.1.2  Experience  in  operating  global  or  regional  hub  airports,  including  achieving  improved 
connectivity 
1.1.3  Track record in route and traffic development and in managing relations with airlines and 
other key stakeholders 
1.1.4  The level of service quality performance achieved at  major airports managed by the airport 
operator and trends over the last five years 
1.1.5  Experience if any, with operating a multi airport system 
1.1.6  The  performance  of  commercial  operations  at  major  airports  managed  by  the  airport 
operators, covering retail, property and other commercial operations, focusing on airports 
where non aeronautical revenues is 40% or more of total revenue. 
1.1.7  Performance in turning around and improving aeronautical and non-aero-nautical operation 
at airports 
1.1.8  Experience in operating and developing airports in non-OECD countries and a track record 
in improved performance 
1.1.9  Experience in proactive environment monitoring, evaluation, planning and implementation 
of environmental systems and improvements 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 2: Experience of the other prime members (separately identifying and 
evaluating Indian and non-Indian prime member experience on an equal weight basis) (weightage 
12.5) 
 
1.2.1  Commercial/retail experience 
1.2.2  Experience with major property development 
1.2.3  Experience with major infrastructure developments 
1.2.4  Experience with handling HR issues in ownership change situations 
 
Sub-Criteria (ii): Management Commitment  
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Commitment of airport operator (weightage 12.5) 
 
2.1.1  Level of equity commitment 
2.1.2  Performance based nature of the airport operator agreement 
2.1.3  Experience and level of management resources committed to the transaction in each area of 
airport management including 
o  Aeronautical operations 
o  Traffic and route development and marketing  
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o  Cargo handling 
o  Slot management 
o  Terminal operations 
o  Airport retail operations 
o  Airport property operations 
o  Environmental management 
 
Pre-Qualification  Criteria  2:  Commitment  by  other  prime  members  (separately  identifying  and 
evaluating Indian prime members) (weightage 12.5) 
 
2.2.1  Experience and level of management resources committed by the other prime members in 
non-aeronautical operations and development  
 
Sub-Criteria (iii): Management Value Add  
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: HR approach (weightage 12.5) 
 
3.1.1  Approach to and level of commitment to the integration of AAI airport employees into the 
JVC 
3.1.2  Proportion of AAI staff targeted for integration into the JVC by year 3 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 2: Transition plan (weightage 12.5) 
 
3.2.1  Transition  plan  that  will  facilitate  the  smooth  and  timely  takeover  by  the  JVC  of  the 
operation and management of the airport  
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 3: Stakeholder management (weightage 6.25) 
 
3.3.1  Systematic and well thought out approach to the management of key stakeholders, including 
identifying key issues and an issues management strategy  
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 4: Environmental management (weightage 6.25) 
 
3.4.1  Environmental management plan that clearly and accurately assesses the environmental 
condition and issues at the airport and has realistic strategies and implementation tasks  
Criteria: Development Capability, Commitment and Value Add 
 
Sub-Criteria (i): Development Capability (Experience) 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Master planning experience (weightage 7.4) 
 
￿  Number of master plans for major international airports completed within the past ten years by 
the  airport  operator  (provide  information  on  scale  of  import,  role  of  airport  operator  in  the 
process and outcomes) 
￿  Geographical spreads of airports for which master plans have been completed within the last ten 
years 
￿  Completed  master  plans  with  similar  issues  to  those  faced  at  the  airport  (eg  international/ 
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Pre-Qualification Criteria 2: Major airport development experience (weightage 15) 
 
(i)  Terminal developments  
 
￿  Implementation  of  ‘state  of  the  art’  international/domestic  terminal  complexes  at  major 
international airports. Provide information on scale of terminal (design, busy hour, annual service 
volume), role of airport operator in the development process, date of opening 
￿  Development experience on existing highly regarded terminals worldwide 
￿  Commercially successful terminals (retail) 
￿  Demonstrated experience in terminal incremental development 
￿  Experience in achieving multi terminal connectivity 
 
(ii)  Aeronautical developments 
 
￿  Number  of  redevelopment  projects  at  multi  run  way  airports  with  substantial  annual  aircraft 
movements (provide information on ATMs) 
￿  Experience in airport development from single to multiple runway configuration 
 
(iii)  Cargo Development 
 
￿  Number  of  cargo  facility  developments  undertaken  within  previous  ten  years  providing 
information on scale of cargo tonnage 
 
(iv)  Road and car park developments 
 
￿  Number of complexity of car and other vehicle on airport parking facilities undertaken within 
previous ten years 
￿  Airport  access  road  developments  undertaken  within  previous  ten  years  including  details  of 
airport access road with complex surface access issues in confined space 
 
(v)  Property developments 
 
￿  Extent and scale of non-aviation developments undertaken at airports within the previous ten 
years 
 
(vi)  Indian development experience 
 
￿  Number and scale of airport and/or other development projects undertaken/completed in India 
within the previous ten years 
 
Sub-Criteria (ii): Development Commitment 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Master planning (weightage 7.4) 
 
￿  Number and disciplines of senior staff experienced in large scale airport master plans 
￿  Geographical spread of experience by senior staff proposed for airport within the previous ten 
years 
￿  Experience of proposed staff within the previous ten years on airport planning of similar sized 
airports with similar traffic mix 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 2: Major airport development (weightage 7.4) 
 
￿  Number of senior staff experienced in airport developments with multiple runway configuration  
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￿  Number of senior staff experienced in major terminal developments within previous ten years, 
involving combined international and domestic terminal complexes 
￿  Geographic spread of experience by senior staff proposed for airport within previous ten years 
￿  Experience in implementing major greenfield airport developments over the past ten years 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 3: Indian infrastructure development (weightage 7.4) 
 
￿  Number  of  senior  staff  proposed  for  airport  with  experience  in  airport  or  other  relevant 
development projects in India 
 
Sub-Criteria (iii): Development Value Add (Vision) 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Long term vision (weightage 8.9) 
 
￿  A long term vision of the airport that maximizes the aeronautical capacity and capability of the 
airport in a cost effective way 
￿  Innovative solutions to maximize capacity for airfields and terminals on a constrained site 
￿  Innovative solutions to prolong the life of airport assets 
￿  Operating initiatives that prolong the life of airport assets 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 2: Development path (weightage 8.9) 
 
￿  Development coast that represents good value for money, taking into account maintenance cost 
￿  Development path that demonstrates and commits to completion of stage 1 activities prior to its 
estimated date of completion as identified in the transaction documents 
￿  Development  path  that  matches  projected  growth  in  traffic  (airfield,  passenger  and  cargo 
terminals, landside roads and car parks etc) 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 3: Flexibility (weightage 8.9) 
 
￿  Plan able to accommodate changes in traffic mix and traffic level  demonstrate that actual traffic 
growth can be accommodated through incremental development 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 4: Aeronautical operations (weightage 8.9) 
 
￿  Staged development plan that has no significant impact on day to day airfield operations 
￿  The staging of a second airport so as to optimize the use of both airports while meeting in a 
timely and efficient way the projected traffic growth 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 5: Development initiatives (weightage 8.9) 
 
￿  Interim measures to provide temporary additional capacity and improve level of service 
o  Terminals 
o  Airfields 
 
Sub-Criteria (iv): Business Plan 
 
Pre-Qualification Criteria 1: Quality of the business plan (weightage 11.0) 
 
￿  Realistic environmental review and assessment of key issues and risks factors 
￿  Planning to achieve significant improvements in passenger and cargo flows and service quality 
with particular emphasis on the first two years of operation and then linked to the implementation 
of major airport developments 
￿  Realistic strategies and implementation tasks and performance targets for the overall operation of 
the airport and in each individual area including  
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o  Aeronautical operations 
o  Traffic and route development 
o  Cargo handling 
o  Passenger processing and terminal operations 
 
[Source: “Restructuring and Modernization of Delhi Airport – Request for Proposal,” Airport 
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[Source: Communication from GMR, 2006]
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Post Bid Events 
IMG (December 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 2005) 
EGoM (December 21, 2005) 
Constitution of CoS 
 
GETE (January 07, 2006) 
Submission of first report 
Bid Submissions (September 14, 2005) 
 
EGoM (January 11, 2006) 
GETE (January 17, 2006) 
Submission of second report 
CoS (January 09, 2006) 
Endorsement of GETE recommendations 
EGoM (January 24, 2006) 
 
EC (November 21, 2005) 
Submission of report 
CoS (December 24, 2005) 
Constitution of GETE 
 
IMG (September 19, 2005) 
1. Constitution of EC 
2. Opening of bids on 22.09.05 
3. Setting up of GRC 
 
MoCA (October 05, 2005) 
Constitution of GRC 
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Excerpts from GETE Report
1 
 
First Report Dated January 07, 2006 
 
2.1  The GETE had their first meeting and deliberations on Friday, December 30, 2005. The 
presentation was basically for explaining the contents of the RFP, the approach adopted by the EC in 
evaluating  the  technical  bids  and  the  views  expressed  by  IMG  on  the  EC  evaluation.  The  EC 
explained that the weightage marks for the two criteria and sub-criteria were already indicated in the 
RFP for the information of bidders. Splitting up these marks to the different sub-factors of sub-
criteria
2 was done by the EC based on the mandate given to them by the IMG on query from the 
GETE, they formed that after the technical bids were opened certain clarifications were invited from 
bidders  mainly  to  sort  out  discrepancies  in  their  submittals  and  not  for  eliciting  additional 
information or submission of additional documents. EC stated that the assignment of marks for 
technical evaluation was done strictly based on the submittals of the tenderers.  
 
2.2  The GETE again met on January 02, 2006 when only Shri Sanjay Narayan and Dr. Sihag 
were present. The consultants were not invited to this meeting. In this meeting Shri Sanjay Narayan 
handed over to the GETE a copy of the note prepared for the CoS dated December 23, 2005 together 
with all annexures which also contained details of marks assigned (both original and revised) to the 
consortiums A to E in The Annexure IX and Appendix II to Annexure XII to the note. In this 
meeting, the GETE enquired at what stage the apportionment of marks to the sub-factors was done 
by the EC and whether after assigning these marks, the same had the approval of the IMG. The 
GETE also wanted to know whether after assigning the marks to the sub-factors, the same were kept 
in a sealed cover to obviate the possibility of any changes or alterations to these marks during 
evaluation stage. The GETE also enquired whether a formal Tender Committee was appointed for 
the technical and financial evaluation of the bids and whether the AAI, as the owner, was associated 
in the technical evaluation. It was informed to the GETE that there was no Tender Committee per se 
and  the  assignment  of  marks  to  the  sub-factors  was  done  entirely  by  the  EC  (The  Global 
Consultants) and at no stage AAI was associated in assessing and assigning the marks. The GETE 
was  informed  that  the  EC  had  taken  about  one  and  a  half  months  to  complete  this  exercise, 
scrutinizing about 40,000 pages of submissions. 
 
2.3  The GETE again met on January 04, 2006 when ABN Amro's letter dated January 03, 2006 
in  reply  to  queries  raised  was  handed  over  to  the  GETE.  From  this  letter  it  appears  inter-se 
weightage and marks to the sub-factors were finalized prior to assigning scores on the offers, but 
there was no categorical assertion that this was finalized before the exercise was started and kept 
sealed. We are only pointing out that since these inter-se weightages were not approved by the 
government and kept sealed, the possibility of these being changed during the course of evaluation 
cannot be ruled out.  
 
2.4  With all the papers made available to the GETE, the need for seeking further clarification 
from the EC was not felt. Therefore, they were not invited for any further clarification by the GETE. 
 
3.0  Scrutiny of the evaluation procedure adopted by EC:  
 
3.1.1  We (GETE) did not call for the technical bid papers nor perused the same. We also did not 
make any attempt for a fresh technical evaluation of the bids by assigning marks to the sub-criteria 
and sub-factors. Our attempt was to assess whether the EC had assigned weightages and marks in a 
logical and transparent manner to the sub-factors and whether there has been any bias in favor of or 
                                                 
1 Modified for easier reading 
2 Please refer ‘Exhibit 5: Excerpts from RFP,’ Section 5.6 on criteria and sub-factors.  
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against any of the bidders while assigning marks. For this we relied upon the RFP and the mark 
sheets attached to the note prepared for the CoS.  
 
3.1.2  While examining the assignments of marks to the various bidders we kept in mind the issues 
raised by the members of the IMG but we were not solely guided by their views. We also examined 
in a dispassionate way whether there was any flaw or bias in the exercise of subjectiveness while 
assigning marks to the different consortiums. Our observations in this matter are briefly given as 
under-  
 
3.1.3  The Global Consultants prepared ITREOI in January, 2004 which was approved by the IMG 
in February, 2004 but the appointment of the Global Consultants was approved by EGoM in April, 
2004. Thus the consultants started working even before their appointment was approved. 
 
3.1.4  From the report of the GRC, it is seen that the EC has stated that their evaluation was not 
based merely on the submittals but they relied upon some published statistics, information available 
within their  setup and  their own  perception and  understanding  of  various aspects  of  evaluation 
(Please refer GRC's report on their meeting dated November 23/24, 2005). This is not in conformity 
to RFP. 
 
4.2  There are 8 pre-qualification criteria in the criteria ‘Management Capability, Commitment 
and Value Add’ out of which 4 have further sub-factors. Similarly there are 11 pre-qualification 
criteria in the criteria ‘Development Capability, Commitment and Value Add’ out of which 8 have 
further sub-factors. 
 
4.3  Through allocation of weightage to different sub-criteria were indicated in RFP, weightage 
to different sub-factors were not indicated but was assigned later by EC based on IMG directions. 
EC has not confirmed explicitly whether these weightages were assigned before or after opening of 
bids.  Certain  anomalies  have  been  observed  in  the  allocation  of  the  weightages.  While  equal 
weightage has been allocated to most of the sub-factors, un-equal allocation has been done in two 
cases  (1.2.2  /1.2.3  &  3.1.1/3.1.2).  The  justification  given  by  EC  that  these  sub-factors  are  of 
different importance is not considered satisfactory and convincing because such a logic can apply to 
many other sub-factors as well. Since weightages of these sub-factors were not mentioned in RFP 
and  allocation  of  equal  weightage  has  been  done  in  majority  of  sub-factors,  we  feel  the  same 
concept of equal weightage should have been adopted for these two sub-factors also. By assigning 
different weightages there is room to suspect that some of the bidders have been favored. 
 
4.4  In  sub-factor  1.1.6,  the  assessment  of  performance  of  commercial  operations  of  major 
airports  covering  retail  property  and  other  commercial  operations  was  to  be  done  focusing  on 
airports having non-aeronautical revenue of 40% or more of total revenue. Though non-aeronautical 
earnings of bidder A
3 are only 37%, but they have been given 75% marks. This is considered to be 
in non-conformity of the RFP. The explanation of EC that wording of the Clause did not make the 
40% mandatory is not convincing. In any case, since the non-aeronautical earnings of bidder A was 
less than the threshold limit of 40%, assigning a high score of 75% was not justified. This should 
have been of the order of 40% to 50%. 
 
4.5  In sub-factor 1.1.8, the assessment of operating in non-OECD countries was to be as per the 
RFP. Bidder A operating in Mexico, which, is an OECD country, has been awarded 75% marks, 
which is not in conformity to RFP. The explanation given by EC to IMG that the bidder has airport 
development experience in other developing countries like Ecuador, Uruguay and Guatemala, is not 
considered convincing. Our considered opinion is the track record in improved performance is also 
to be judged only in the context of a non-OECD country. Therefore, awarding marks against this 
item is not considered in conformity to the item in RFP. 
 
                                                 
3 Bidder A: Reliance-ASA, Bidder B: GMR-Fraport, Bidder C: DS Construction-Munich, Bidder D: Sterlite-
Macquarie, Bidder E: Essel-TAV, Bidder F: GVK-ACSA  
 
 
Page No. 52  W.P.  No.  2007-05-01 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
4.6  In sub-factor 3.1.2 (proportion of AAI Staff targeted for absorption into JVC by year 3), EC 
has awarded 50% marks for minimum 40% absorption and remaining 50% on prorata basis between 
40% to 100% absorption. Since RFP has stipulated 40% absorption as minimum acceptable and 
additional weightage has been contemplated for a higher proportion of absorption, we feel it is more 
reasonable and rational to distribute full marks to 100% absorption. 
 
4.7  If moderation of marks for the above mentioned items is done, following reduction in the 
score of bidder A will take place:    
 
S No  Item  Delhi  Mumbai 
(i)  If equal weightage is given to sub-factors 1.2.2 & 1.2.3  1.1  1.1 
(ii)  If equal weightage is given to sub-factors 3.1.1 & 3.1.2  0.6  0.5 
(iii)  If the marks of sub-factor 1.1.6 given for non-aeronautical 
revenue less than 40% are reduced from 75 % to 50%  0.7  0.7 
(iv)  If score of sub-factor 1.1.8 given for experience in an OECD 
country, is excluded  2.1  2.1 
(v)  If marking system of sub-factor 3.1.2 as modified keeping ‘0’ 
for 40% absorption and '5' for 100% absorption  1.9  1.6 
  Total (i) to (v)  6.4  6.0 
  Resultant score of 'A' for criteria ‘Management Capability’  74.6  75.0 
 
From the above, it is clear that the above moderation clearly disqualifies bidder A in criteria 4.1.1. 
 
4.8  Modernisation  exercise  attempted  above  will  not  make  any  material  difference  in  the 
position of bidders C, D, E and F who will remain still disqualified. In regard to bidder B he will 
still be well above the qualifying marks of 80%. In fact his position would improve marginally. 
Therefore,  we  have  not  attempted  to  moderate  the  marks  of  the  other  bidders  based  on  our 
observations of paras 4.3 to 4.6. 
 
4.9  While scrutinizing the marks for criteria ‘Development Capability, Commitment and Value 
Add’ we have the following observations to make: 
 
The GETE have not studied the development plan of this bidder or any other bidder for that matter. 
We have also not discussed this with the GTA (Air Plan). Considering the type of deficiencies in the 
developmental plans pointed out by AAI, we feel the marking of bidder A has been on a liberal side 
in regard to sub-criteria ‘Development Value Add.’ This will also be the marks if we compare the 
marks scored by bidder B verses marks scored by bidder A in regard to Delhi airport as brought out 
under: 
 
  Maximum Score  Score of  ‘A’  Score of  'B' 
Delhi  44.5  43.0  30.2 
           
4.10  Admittedly bidder B has better credentials, for airport development and such vast difference 
in marks scored by bidder A over bidder B cannot be easily explained. We feel that if the rational 
approach has been adopted bidder A who now gets qualified by 1.1 marks for Delhi and by 0.3 
marks for Mumbai would have been disqualified. 
 
4.11  Since in any case in our view bidder A gets disqualified on the basis of our assessment 
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Second Report Dated January 17, 2006 
 
Based on the methodology adopted by GETE for moderating the marks of bidder A, we have now 
moderated the scores of all other bidders as well. Based on this exercise, the marks secured by the 
different bidders are given in a tabulated form separately for Delhi and Mumbai airports. 
 
Moderated Scores (Management Capabilities etc) for Delhi Airport 
 
S No  Weightage  A  B  C  D  E 
1.1  25.0  19.6  22.5  17.1  19.7  6.7 
1.2   12.5  9.2  9.7  9.7  4.7  2.8 
2.1   12.5  9.6  7.1  11.7  6.7  7.5 
2.2  12.5  11.3  10.0  11.3  5.0  5.0 
3.1  12.5  10.6  10.5  10.9  7.2  6.9 
3.2  12.5  11.3  12.5  5.0  7.5  2.5 
3.3 & 3.4  12.5  9.4  12.5  7.5  6.3  6.3 
Total  100  81.0  84.8  73.2  57.1  37.7 
Score as per shift    80.9  84.7  73.1  57.0  37.6 
 
Moderation due to 
(i)  If equal weightage is given to sub-factor 
1.2.2 and 1.2.3 
  -1.09  -0.21  -0.02  -0.02  +0.96 
(ii)  If equal weightage is given to sub-factor 
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 
  -0.60  -0.81  +0.35  -0.32  +1.85 
(iii)  If the marks of sub-factor 1.1.6 given to 
A for non-aeronautical revenue less than 
40%  are  reduced  from  75%  to  50% 
others no change. 
  -0.70  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
(iv)  If  score  of  sub-factor  1.1.8  given          
for experience in OECD country to A is 
excluded – others no change. 
  -2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
(v)  If marking system of sub-factor 3.1.2   is 
modified  keeping  ‘0’  for  40% 
absorption and ‘5’ for 100% absorption. 
  -1.60  -1.98  -0.17  -3.13  0.0 
Total variation    -6.09  -3.00  +0.16  -3.47  +2.81 
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Moderated Scores (Management Capabilities etc) for Mumbai Airport 
 
S No  Weightage  A  B  C  D  E  F 
1.1  25.0  19.6  22.5  17.1  19.7  6.7  17.2 
1.2  12.5  9.2  9.7  9.7  4.7  2.8  9.5 
2.1  12.5  9.6  7.1  11.7  6.7  5.4  8.8 
2.2  12.5  11.3  10.0  11.3  5.0  5.0  10.0 
3.1  12.5  10.8  10.5  10.9  7.2  6.9  10.5 
3.2  12.5  11.3  12.5  5.0  7.5  2.5  11.3 
3.3&3.4  12.5  9.4  12.5  7.5  6.3  6.3  8.8 
Total  100  81.2  84.8  73.2  57.1  35.6  76.1 
Score as per shift    81.0  84.7  73.1  57.0  35.5  76.0 
 
Moderation due to 
(i)  If equal weightage is given to 
sub-factor 1.2.2 and 1.2.3    -1.09  -0.21  -0.02  -0.02  +0.96  -0.23 
(ii)  If equal weightage is given to 
sub-factor 3.1.1 and 3.1.2    -0.49  -0.81  +0.35  -0.32  +1.85  -0.81 
(iii)  If  the  marks  of  sub-factor 
1.1.6  given  to  A  for  non-
aeronautical revenue less than 
40% are reduced from 75% to 
50% others no change 
  -0.70  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
(iv)  If  score  of  sub-factor  1.1.8 
given for experience in OECD 
country  to  A  is  excluded-
others no change 
  -2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
(v)  If  marking  system  of  sub-
factor  3.1.2  is  modified   
keeping '0' for 40% absorption 
and ‘5’ for 100% absorption 
  -1.82  -1.98  -0.17  -3.13  0.0  -1.98 
Total variation     -6.20  -3.00  +0.16  -3.47  +2.81  -3.02 
Revised score    74.8  81.7  73.3  53.5  38.3  73.0 
[Source: SC, 2006. ‘The Supreme Court Judgment: Reliance Airport Developers Pvt. Ltd vs  
Airports Authority of India and Others.’ 2006 INDLAW SC 913. http://www.indlaw.com (accessed on 
January 15, 2007) 
Author’s Note: The final marks are given on page 14. 
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Exhibit 9 
 
Key Statistics of Airport Traffic 
 
                  % Change 










International  158.0  133.0  116.0  108.0  18.8  14.7  7.4 
Domestic  572.0  506.0  444.0  402.0  13.0  14.0  10.4 




International  19.5  16.6  14.8  13.6  17.5  12.2  8.8 
Domestic  40.1  32.1  28.9  26.4  24.9  11.1  9.5 
Total  59.5  48.7  43.7  40.0  22.2  11.4  9.3 
Cargo movement 
(thousand tons) 
International  825.0  693.0  646.0  560.0  19.0  7.3  15.4 
Domestic  465.0  375.0  333.0  294.0  24.0  12.6  13.3 
Total  1,290.0  1,068.0  979.0  854.0  20.8  9.1  14.6 
Delhi Airport 
Aircrafts movement (thousands)  122.0  106.0  93.0  86.0  15.1  14.0  8.1 
Passenger movement (million)  12.8  10.2  8.8  8.2  25.5  15.9  7.3 
Cargo movement (thousand tons)  344.0  296.0  276.0  233.0  16.2  7.2  18.5 
Mumbai Airport 
Aircrafts movement (thousands)  153.0  137.0  126.0  115.0  11.7  8.7  9.6 
Passenger movement (million)  15.7  12.8  11.7  11.0  22.7  9.4  6.4 
Cargo movement (thousand tons)  403.0  326.0  308.0  276.0  23.6  5.8  11.6 
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Glossary 
 
AAI    Airports Authority of India 
AERA  Airport Economic Regulatory Authority 
AG  Attorney General 
AMSS  Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co 
BCAS  Bureau of Civil Aviation Security 
CAGR  Compounded Annual Growth Rate 
CoS  Committee of Secretaries 
DGCA  Directorate General of Civil Aviation 
DMRC  Delhi Metro Rail Corporation 
EBITDA  Earnings before Interest Tax and Depreciation/Amortisation 
EC  Evaluation Committee 
EGoM    Empowered Group of Ministers 
EOI  Expression of Interest 
FC   Financial Consultants 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GETE  Group of Eminent Technical Experts 
GoI  Government of India 
GRC  Government Review Committee 
GTA     Global Technical Advisor 
IATA  International Air Transport Association 
IMG    Inter Ministerial Group 
ITREOI  Invitation to Register an Expressions of Interest 
JVC  Joint Venture Company 
LC   Legal Consultants 
LD  Lease Deed 
MoCA    Ministry of Civil Aviation 
NDA  National Democratic Alliance 




Public Private Partnership 
PQB  Pre-Qualified Bidders 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
RoFR  Right of First Refusal 
SA  Substitution Agreement 
SGSA  State Government Support Agreement 
SHA  Shareholders Agreement 
SPV  Special Purpose Vehicle 
SSA  State Support Agreement 
TVA  Thakur, Vaidyanath Aiyar & Co 
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